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Article

New Evidence on Appeal
Jeffrey C. Dobbins†
INTRODUCTION
Appellate review is limited, almost by definition, to consideration of the factual record as established in the trial court.1
This limitation, along with deferential standards of review on
findings of fact, respects trial processes for presenting, evaluating, and admitting evidence, protects the fairness of the system
to the parties, and helps ensure accuracy through the advocacy
of counsel and the evaluation of impartial judges and juries.2
The limitation also focuses appellate courts on their area of expertise—the resolution of questions of law—while recognizing
the superior experience of trial courts (or, in some cases, agencies) in resolving questions of fact. Consistent with this traditional understanding of appellate review, appellate courts typi† Assistant Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law.
Thanks to Aaron Andrew-Bruhl, Joan Steinman, support from Willamette
University College of Law, and the research assistance of Melanie IversonKaufman. Copyright © 2012 by Jeffrey C. Dobbins.
1. DANIEL J. MEADOR & JORDANA S. BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 2 (1994) (“In deciding cases, American appellate courts
consider only those facts that were determined by the judge or jury in the trial
court. They rarely receive additional evidence, relying instead on the ‘record’
made at trial.”); id. at 55 (“[A]n important characteristic of American appellate
practice is the controlling force accorded to the record, the documents and
formal written transcript from the trial proceedings. The general proposition,
subject to qualifications discussed below, is that an appellate court considers
only those facts that were established at trial and reviews only those questions
that were properly raised and preserved in the trial court, as evidenced by the
record.”); see also FED. R. APP. P. 10(a) (defining the record on appeal); infra
Part I.A.
2. See generally MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 55–56 (discussing reasons for appellate courts not deciding issues not raised at trial);
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.11 cmt., at 24 –25 (1994)
(explaining general principles for appellate court review); Brianne J. Gorod,
The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE
L.J. 1, 3–5 (2011) (stating some problems with appellate judges looking outside the trial record).
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cally reject efforts by parties to introduce on appeal “new evidence” that could have been, but was not, presented below.3
Despite this traditional understanding and plain-language
rules that echo that understanding, there are nevertheless
many occasions in which federal and state appellate courts will
consider new evidence on appeal. Whether presented through
petitions for discretionary review (alleging the importance of a
particular case in a broader social context), amicus briefs (explaining the broad factual or technical background of a case),
social-science-laden “Brandeis briefs,” or other mechanisms for
supplementing the record, appellate courts often consider and
rely upon this sort of new evidence.4 Indeed, in a world where
volumes of information are available at the click of a mouse or
swipe of a screen, some kinds of new evidence can easily find
their way into a decision through a court’s own research, rather
than via introduction by a party.5
Much, though by no means all,6 of this new evidence falls
into the category of legislative facts. Discussed in more detail
below,7 these are, in essence, facts that are not directly related
to the specific events in a particular case.8 Commentators have
noted that judicial consideration of this kind of information is
part and parcel of the lawmaking responsibility (or, depending
on one’s perspective, impermissible activism) of appellate

3. See, e.g., Berger v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 295 Fed. App’x 42, 46 (6th
Cir. 2008) (“This court does not consider non-record materials.”); Hahn v. Diaz-Barba, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 255–56 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting effort by counsel to supplement record with affidavits, presented for the first
time on appeal, seeking to “authenticate the social network profile pages” of a
party).
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. Consider, for instance, the articles collected in the Sept.–Oct. 2006
volume of Judicature, which discuss the relative merits of ( primarily trial)
courts conducting their own research into the validity of scientific information.
See 90 JUDICATURE 58–67 (2006) (collecting several articles); see also Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 REV. LITIG. 131, 142–74 (2008) (discussing current law and
ethical considerations of appellate courts introducing new evidence on appeal).
6. See infra Part II.B.1–3.
7. See infra Part II.B.4.
8. See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.5,
at 937–38 (5th ed. 2010) (“Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of
who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury
case. . . . Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but
are the general facts that help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy
and discretion.”).
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courts.9 Even that commentary, however, focuses little on the
origin of the underlying principle, or the source and exercise of
an appellate court’s authority to ignore that principle in order
to consider new evidence—whether legislative fact, adjudicative
fact, or otherwise.
The lack of commentary on the fundamental principles is
echoed in the written rules governing appellate court processes.
Although those rules may define the creation and assembly of
the particular documents that are the “record on appeal,”10
those rules simply presume the underlying principle—that appellate review is limited to that record, and, in particular, that
any factual information considered by the appellate court must
have been presented to the trial court. The principle is an unspoken understanding, and the exceptions to it are even less
clearly defined. The lack of definition allows appellate courts
near-plenary control over when and whether they will consider
at least certain types of new evidence on appeal.
It is this largely unconstrained control over a procedural
matter at the heart of the appellate process in which this Article is primarily interested.11 Through an examination of when,
where, and how appellate courts examine new evidence on ap9. See Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial, Legislative and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV.
1, 7 (1986); Robert E. Keeton, Lecture, Legislative Facts and Similar Things:
Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 21–25, 31–32 (1988);
Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in
Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 197, 197–98 (2000); Brenda C. See, Written
in Stone? The Record on Appeal and the Decision-Making Process, 40 GONZ. L.
REV. 157, 194 (2005) (“The idea that a court has a legislative function apart
from its error-correction function has led to the development of the notion that
appellate courts may seek all kinds of information unrelated to the adjudication of the case at hand.”); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 114 –16 (1988).
10. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 10(a) (defining the record on appeal to include
particular material introduced in the trial court); CAL. APP. R. 8.120 (defining
the “normal record on appeal” to simply be certain records from proceedings
below).
11. The absence of positive law regarding the nature of record review
places it in the company of many other fundamental principles that govern the
day-to-day processing of cases throughout our legal system, but that merit little discussion in the case law and only passing consideration in developing the
rules (if any) that reflect those principles. Like the doctrines governing what
counts as binding precedent, standards of review, or the “inherent” or “supervisory” authority to modify those underlying principles, the doctrines that govern the record on review amount to common law rules of procedure. See Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (2010)
(regarding rules of precedent).
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peal, this Article seeks to define the principles underlying appellate record review in our court structure, and to use those
principles to elucidate how appellate courts and judges function
within the broader legal system, as well as how that system interacts with those appellate courts.
To that end, Part I defines the general doctrine that limits
appellate review to the evidence generated in the prior proceedings and examines the origin of, and some of the justifications
for, that principle. Part II examines several exceptions to the
general principle, and looks at how those exceptions intersect
with principles of judicial notice and the consideration of legislative facts.
Finally, the Conclusion considers those exceptions collectively in the context of the purpose of appellate courts in our legal system. That broad examination recognizes and highlights
the pitfalls associated with at least some uses of new evidence
on appeal. By using such information without the prior checks
provided by a trial court’s advocacy process, appellate courts
risk drawing erroneous factual conclusions, or drawing conclusions that, while correct at the time, do not disclose their factual conclusions in a manner that permits correction (should it be
necessary) at a later date.12 In addition, the unthinking use of
such evidence may undermine confidence in the work of both
appellate and trial courts, and may draw not entirely unjustified attention as a demonstration of appellate-court lawmaking
that goes beyond the appropriate scope of decision-making for
appellate courts.
Nevertheless, this Article concludes, appellate courts
should consider explicitly embracing the use of new evidence on
appeal in certain circumstances. A review of history and these
exceptions demonstrates that both the traditional rule and the
exceptions to it have developed in a rather haphazard and organic manner over time; as a result, there is little in the way of
positive law (meaning statutes, rules, or other written mandates) that would prohibit the use of new evidence on appeal.
While appropriate safeguards would need to be established in
order to avoid unfairness, this kind of appellate codification of
the exceptions would have the salutary effect of making consideration of this evidence more routine, rather than something to
hide. By taking such an open approach, the courts will be able
12. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 2, at 33–38 (discussing the varying reliance and use of factual findings not included in the trial court record across
different courts and cases).
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to address the pitfalls noted above. Furthermore, by making
the gathering and consideration of legislative facts more open,
and pointing out that consideration of such evidence on appeal
is not so unusual as an historical matter, courts may be able to
avoid the worst accusations of judicial activism that are otherwise levied when courts go beyond the record in order to decide
socially, economically, or technically complex appeals. By focusing on the legislative fact problem from a broader perspective—
that of appellate procedure generally and the regular use of
new evidence in a variety of contexts—the concerns identified
by a variety of commentators in this area can be alleviated.
There is, in short, much to be gained by recognizing, rationalizing, and codifying the use of new evidence on appeal,
and the final sections of this Article outline ways in which this
useful goal can be accomplished.
I. THE PRINCIPLES & PURPOSES OF RECORD REVIEW
A. RECORD REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
The general rule13 regarding record review on appeal is a
familiar one: In conducting their review of a judgment below,
appellate courts review only the information that was presented in that tribunal.14 “‘An appellate court can properly consider
only the record and facts before the district court and thus only
those papers and exhibits filed in the district court can constitute the record on appeal.’”15 As one appellate judge characterized the record review principle, “I can’t think of anything more
fundamental than that.”16
13. Although appellate court rules define the scope of the record for purposes of a given appellate court’s review, my reference to the general record
review “rule” is intended (unless specifically mentioned otherwise) to refer not
to those rules, but to the general principle or doctrine that appellate court review should be limited to the trial court record. Throughout this Article, then,
the terms record review “rule,” “doctrine” and “principle” are used interchangeably to refer to the same traditional principle.
14. Statements of the principle are legion. See, for example, those excerpted in the text. See also Ford v. Potter, 354 Fed. App’x 28, 31 (5th Cir.
2009) (“Generally, we will not enlarge the record on appeal with evidence not
before the district court.”); Neeb v. Lastrapes, 64 So. 3d 278, 283 (La. Ct. App.
2011) (“An appellate court cannot review evidence that is not in the record on
appeal and cannot receive new evidence.”).
15. Bath Junkie Branson, L.L.C. v. Bath Junkie, Inc., 528 F.3d 556, 559–
60 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Huelsman v. Civic Ctr. Corp., 873 F.2d 1171, 1175
(8th Cir. 1989)); see also FED. R. APP. P. 10(a).
16. THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS 160 (1978)
(quoting an interview with an appellate judge).
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The principle is so firmly established that courts often suggest that there is something unseemly, even if not quite unethical, about an effort by counsel to introduce new evidence on
appeal.
The entire system of determining disputes by trial before a court rests
on the assumption that decisions must be based on the evidence submitted to (and held admissible by) the court and nothing else. In the
normal situation, attempts to rely on nonrecord facts in appellate
courts are “unprofessional conduct.”17

Thus, in rejecting an effort by appellate counsel to introduce
new information on appeal, a California appellate court concluded that it would “disregard statements in the briefs that
are based on such improper matter.”18 The thread of moral disapproval is echoed in the reluctance of judges to mention their
use of new evidence on appeal,19 and it suggests the degree to
which this fundamental principle of appellate practice governs
the behavior of participants within it.20
The record review principle does not stand alone; it is, in a
sense, a specialized form of the rule limiting appellate court
consideration to arguments that were preserved below. Thus,
not only is “determination of facts . . . the responsibility of the
trial court, [with] the appellate court being responsible only for
ascertaining that a factual conclusion is reasonably supported
by the evidence” presented below, but “an appellate court
should consider only those contentions that were initially made
in the trial court. Observance of this rule obliges the parties to
submit their cases in full in the trial court.”21 As is discussed

17. ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 10.12, at 276 (2d ed. 1989) (noting also “[t]hat parties and courts, including
appellate courts, are limited to reliance upon facts in the record is an accepted
principle which, like most principles, is generally true but not invariably”).
18. Truong v. Nguyen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 688 (Cal Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added).
19. See MARVELL, supra note 16, at 165 (“[ W ]ritten opinions are of no
help, since judges would not be expected to announce that they were influenced by such facts.”); Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence
in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 406 (1942) (“Probably a
systematic investigation of this subject would be unfruitful . . . for the general
custom of judges has been to make no mention in formal opinions of extrarecord sources of information.”).
20. But see MARVELL, supra note 16, at 165–66 (noting exceptions to the
general principle (discussed infra) and suggesting that courts often had no
particular problem with counsel referencing facts outside of the record).
21. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 2.
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further below, the principles of record review and preservation
arise out of the same historical provenance.22
Commentators describing the limitation on new evidence
on appeal list a number of rationales for the principle. These
justifications generally boil down to considerations of economy
and fairness. Under the record review rule, primary responsibility for factual development is left to the trial court, with its
accompanying rules of evidence and established processes for
capturing testimony and documentary evidence; that allocation
of responsibility allows an efficient division of labor between
the factually oriented trial courts and law-oriented appellate
courts.23 Fairness, on the other hand, is enhanced by ensuring
that information is initially submitted within the context of the
daily adversarial give-and-take of trial court process, allowing
parties who object to certain evidence to be able to challenge it
via well-established mechanisms for presenting and assessing
evidence.24 Other principles aided by the record rule include accuracy (a principle related to fairness, since accuracy helps to
ensure that all facts would be first tested, and relevance determined by, a trial court judge)25 and finality (a principle related to economy, since finality limits the ability of parties to
re-argue cases multiple times).26
The principle regarding record review is so well-ingrained
in our system that there is little in the way of criticism. In most
cases, challenges are only indirect—a commentator may note,
22. There is another parallel between the principles of record review and
preservation: like the former, there is very little that regulates the latter. “The
United States Supreme Court has declined to announce any guidelines as to
when appellate courts should consider arguments raised for the first time on
appeal, rather than in the trial court.” DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE
COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES AND PERSONNEL 201 (2d ed.
2006); see also infra text accompanying notes 105–06. For a recent discussion
of the preservation rule and a fine review of exceptions to it, see Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and Propriety of Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911455.
23. See, e.g., MARVELL, supra note 16; STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 2.
24. See, e.g., MARVELL, supra note 16, at 161 (articulating fairness argument in favor of record review rule); See, supra note 9, at 184 –85 (noting that
the purpose of Canon Three of the Model Code of Judicial Ethics, which limits
the ability of courts to consider ex parte communication, is “motivated by the
concern for fairness and its appearance”); see also Gorod, supra note 2, at 3–5,
21–25 (discussing adversarial premise of American court system).
25. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 56.
26. Id.
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for instance, that the principle leads to a risk of injustice associated with a lack of information about what may have actually
occurred in a given case—but that cost is generally seen as justified in light of the efficiency and fairness benefits associated
with the rule. That said, there have been some concentrated
criticisms of the record review rule, most notably the arguments, discussed in the following Section, made by Harvard
Law Dean Roscoe Pound in the 1930s and 40s.
B. THE ORIGIN OF, AND CHALLENGES TO, THE RECORD REVIEW
PRINCIPLE
Given the near-universal acceptance of the principle limiting appellate review to the factual record below, it is perhaps
not surprising that the general principle is so rarely discussed
or noted. While rules of court define the scope of the record on
review, there is little analysis regarding the rationale for the
rule, its underlying substance, or the wisdom of retaining it.
The principle has been a part of American legal practice for so
long that it seems a fundamental point.
There have been some exceptions. In his writings before
World War II, Roscoe Pound criticized excessive attention to
the record as “record worship.”27 Pound’s concern was much
broader than the specific form of the factual record on appeal.28
Nevertheless, he believed that an excessive focus on the record—and errors on the face of the record—led courts to ignore
the appropriate outcome “had it been possible to get the real
case before the [reviewing] court.”29 One treatment for that
problem, he concluded, would be to allow appellate courts to
consider new evidence on appeal.30
In suggesting an abandonment of the traditional approach,
Pound found support in his historical conclusions that the record review doctrine was “an anachronism.”31 The doctrine was,
in essence, an historical accident, rather than a consciously de27. See ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES passim
(1941) [hereinafter POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE]; ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 161 (1930) [hereinafter POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE]
(“[Record worship is] an excessive regard for the formal record at the expense
of the case, a strict scrutiny of that record for ‘errors of law’ at the expense of
scrutiny of the case to insure the consonance of the result to the demands of
substantive law.”).
28. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE, supra note 27, at 35, 377–93.
29. Id. at 35.
30. Id. at 387–88.
31. Id. at 387.
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veloped principle supported by a rational division of judicial
responsibilities.32
As Pound noted, even the English courts of review would
occasionally permit consideration of new evidence on appeal.33
Any knee-jerk reaction against allowing such a consideration
was, in his view, a reactionary and unnecessary reliance on
dust-bound rules of procedure that developed out of an altogether different—and much stricter—legal system.34
Pound’s understanding of the history of the record review
rule is echoed in more recent writings. As Daniel Meador &
Jordana Bernstein note, the principle finds its origin
in the writ of error in the English common-law courts. At common law
there was no concept of an appeal like that in the modern-day United
States. Instead, a party against whom a judgment had been rendered
at nisi prius could seek a writ of error from the court at Westminster,
assigning specified errors of law committed by the trial judge. The
proceeding, in effect, made the trial judge a defendant. Under that
procedure the judge could not have been guilty of error unless a matter had been presented to him and he had ruled on it.35

The term “appeal,” on the other hand, arose, at least in
part, out of the courts of equity and emphasized the effort to
reach the “right” decision, rather than adherence to the hidebound principles of preservation and record review.36 Over
time, the principles of review inherent in the equity courts
merged with the much stricter procedural obligations associated with the law courts’ writ of error and gave rise to our modern appellate process along with the obligations regarding
preservation and record review.37
It is hard to know how far Pound would press his reform
proposals today. The appellate courts are, as has been pointed
out repeatedly since at least the late 1960s and early 1970s,

32. Id.; see also id. at 38–320 (discussing historical development of appellate processes); See, supra note 9, at 158–68 (sketching a history of record development in appellate procedure).
33. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE, supra note 27, at 387–88.
34. Id. at 388.
35. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 58.
36. Id. at 58–59; see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in
America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 915, 926–27 (1997). Bilder points out that the
history of the “appeal” in American law is rooted in sources much broader than
the equity courts considered by Pound. At the same time, however, she does
not separately seek to identify a source for the now-dominant record review
rule beyond that identified by Pound: the procedures associated with the
common law writ of error.
37. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 55–59.

2012]

NEW EVIDENCE ON APPEAL

2025

faced with a “crisis of volume.”38 It seems difficult to imagine
allowing appellate courts to regularly consider new evidence—
or to create mechanisms for doing so—when they have enough
trouble processing cases under the existing and far stricter record review principle.
Nevertheless, several points can be drawn from Pound’s
analysis. First, the historical examination presented by him
and repeated by subsequent scholars demonstrates that the
record review rule is rooted, along with its parallel preservation
requirement, more in vestiges of the historical relationships between the English courts, rather than a conscious evaluation of
the role of appellate courts within our legal system.
Second, the organic development of the principle limiting
the scope of appellate review to the trial court record explains
much about why the principle is so rarely discussed. It is part
of our fundamental understanding of the relationship between
appellate and trial courts. While that relationship has changed
somewhat over the years, it is rare that it has done so with an
exhaustive examination into this kind of fundamental relationship (particularly in light of the crowded dockets at all levels).
Third, in light of that historical development, there is very
little in positive law that requires the rule to remain the same.
Though unusual and creative, Pound’s modest proposal to permit appellate courts to consider new evidence was not only
permissible, but entirely consistent with his effort to develop a
more effective appellate process.39 To the degree that alternatives to the record review rule exist, it is largely historical convention, rather than considered analysis, that prevents those
alternatives from being adopted.
Finally, Pound’s prescription for change suggests that we
should consider thinking about the new evidence exceptions to
the general principle in a different light. Rather than consider
the exceptions discussed in Part II as bizarre deviations from
existing practice, they can instead be conceived of as small forays into a broader examination of how the record review rule
works—and how it should work—in the broader appellate sys38. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1112 n.9
(2011) (noting that the phrase “crisis of volume” regarding the appellate courts
came into common usage in the early 1970s); see also, e.g., Paul D. Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 554 (1969); Huang, supra,
at 1112–13 & nn.7–12.
39. See POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE, supra note 27, at 377–93 (describing the full scope of his proposals).
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tem. There are systemic alternatives to record review, in other
words, that should make us think more critically of the way
that record review works in our current system.
Meador and Bernstein note that there are some systems in
which this kind of systemic alternative is employed. In the
“German appellate courts known as Oberlandesgerichte and in
the English Court of Appeal, Criminal Division,” the appellate
courts focus their review on equitable outcomes, even if record
review rules are cast aside in the process.40
Furthermore, they point out, some states permit this kind
of review as well: “California statutes, for example, authorize
the appellate court to receive new evidence and to make factual
determinations different from those made by the trial court.
That authority, however, is exercised sparingly.”41 Noting
docket volume concerns, they conclude that the limited use of
this power is wise: “Although there may be some attraction to
that role by appellate courts striving to serve the interests of
justice in each case, it would raise serious questions as to the
most appropriate allocation of judicial functions and resources.”42
C. NEW EVIDENCE IN REVIEWING COURTS AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Although the primary focus of this Article is on the role of
new evidence in appellate review of trial court proceedings, the
general rule also applies in judicial review of administrative
agency decisions. As noted below, there are important differences between the record review rule in the regular judicial
context and that in the administrative law context. Nevertheless, because some of the most significant observations regarding the use of extra-record evidence were initially offered as
commentary on administrative proceedings,43 and because the
exceptions to the general rule are quite common in administrative law cases, the administrative law principle is worth noting
40. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 59.
41. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 909 (West 2009) (“In all cases
where trial by jury is not a matter of right . . . the reviewing court may make
factual determinations contrary to or in addition to those made by the trial
court . . . . The reviewing court may . . . take additional evidence of or concerning facts occurring at any time prior to the decision of the appeal.”); In re Zeth
S., 73 P.3d 541, 547 (Cal. 2003) (noting “exceptional circumstances” necessary
before appellate court would consider new evidence on appeal under § 909).
42. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 59.
43. See Davis, supra note 19; see also Gorod, supra note 2, at 51–52.
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here.
Under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as under most
state-level APAs, judicial review of administrative action is limited to the factual record as developed by the agency.44 “It is
black letter law that, except in the rare case, review in federal
court must be based on the record before the agency and, hence,
a reviewing court may not go outside the administrative record.”45 Whether reviewing agency action under the federal APA
or under most state APAs, the general rule is that the “appellate” court (sometimes the trial court, if a petition is initially
filed there, rather than the court of appeals) is limited to reviewing the agency decision in the context of the factual record
considered and assembled by the agency.46
Although there are significant parallels between appellate
review of agency decisions and the review of judicial decisions,
those situations are not identical. First, the record review rule
in the administrative context is, at least in part, an outgrowth
of the oft-heated discussion regarding the proper role of administrative agencies. That discussion between politicians, administrators, attorneys, and academics, rather than an organic
outgrowth of common law, led to the federal,47 and later, the
state, APAs.48 To that degree, then, the administrative record
review rule is the product of a different process than the development of the judicial rule.
Second, the record itself, particularly in informal rulemak44. See MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINLAW 578–80 (3d ed. 2009) (explaining that the federal rule is “firmly established,” while the rule in states is more mixed, with some states following the “open record” rule); PIERCE, supra note 8, § 11.6.
45. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: JUDICIAL REVIEW § 8306, at 73 (2006).
46. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some
new record made initially in the reviewing court.”); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971).
47. For a history of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, see George
Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 N.W. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996); see also PIERCE, supra
note 8, § 1.4.
48. As commentators have pointed out, the strictness of the administrative record requirement under at least the federal APA is not entirely clear
from the plain language of the APA. That has not stopped courts from imposing a strict record review rule on reviewing courts, however; it may be that
this is due in part to the influence of the traditional judicial record review
rule.
ISTRATIVE
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ing and adjudication, may be much more poorly defined than is
true for trial court records, which usually arise out of a much
more formalized process.49 Finally, the administrative law record review principle does not apply solely within the judiciary,
but in cases where the decision under review comes from an executive agency. That inter-branch relationship means that the
record review rule in the administrative context is at least partly motivated by considerations of separation of powers that are
not present when review is occurring entirely within the judicial branch.50
There are both global and narrow exceptions to the general
rule. While most states and federal agencies work under a
“closed record” rule like that for appeals from trial courts, there
are some states in which an “open record” principle applies.51
In these states, “a court may consider new evidence regarding
‘any material fact’” not otherwise required to be generated on
the record.52 And even in the federal closed record system,
courts have set forth specific rules regarding when evidence
outside the scope of the agency-designated record can be considered.53
When compared to the management of exceptions to the
judicial record review rule, the discussion and diversity of
views regarding this principle in the administrative context is
notable. This is due in part to both the statutory source of the
49. See James N. Saul, Overly Restrictive Administrative Records and the
Frustration of Judicial Review, 38 ENVTL. L. 1301, 1313–14 (2008) (discussing
the range of possible ways in which the scope of the administrative record
could be established).
50. Daniel J. Rohlf, Avoiding the ‘Bare Record’: Safeguarding Meaningful
Judicial Review of Federal Agency Actions, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 575, 588
(2009) (citing Asarco, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160
(9th Cir. 1980)) (noting that courts “explain in terms of separation of powers
their view of the APA as placing limitations on courts’ use of information outside the agency’s ‘whole record’”).
51. ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 44, at 579–80.
52. Id. (citing MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 5-114(a)(3) (1981);
Lake Sunapee Protective Ass’n v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 574 A.2d 1368, 1373
(N.H. 1990)). Even closed record states have exceptions to the general rule.
Consider, for instance, Norden v. Oregon Water Resources Department, 996
P.2d 958, 961–63 (Or. 2000) (concluding that under the Oregon APA, parties
seeking review of an order in “other than a contested case” may present additional evidence to the trial court before that court determines whether the order was supported by substantial evidence).
53. See Lands Council v. Powell, Reg’l Forester of Region One, 395 F.3d
1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005) (new evidence permitted to determine if agency has
considered all relevant factors, relied on documents not on record, or acted in
bad faith, or to explain difficult technical matters).

2012]

NEW EVIDENCE ON APPEAL

2029

administrative rule and the history of discussions regarding the
appropriate nature of administrative processes. It is in the
open nature of the discussion regarding the administrative rule
that the contrast is most dramatic. The scope of the exceptions
to the rule is, if anything, broader in the appellate context than
in the administrative one. It is to those exceptions that we now
turn.
II. THE EXCEPTIONS: CONSIDERING NEW EVIDENCE
ON APPEAL
The general rule discussed in Part I is familiar territory to
those who have even a basic familiarity with appellate courts
and the appellate process. There are, however, many situations
in which appellate courts stray from black letter procedure and
permit (or even invite) consideration of new evidence on appeal.
While the most significant categories are discussed below, there
are certainly more examples than those mentioned specifically
in the text and footnotes. After all, “the general custom of judges has been to make no mention in formal opinions of extrarecord sources of information.”54 In considering these exceptions to the record review rule, then, “[w]ritten opinions are of
no help, since judges would not be expected to announce that
they were influenced by” new evidence on appeal.55 It is nevertheless possible to broadly characterize the mechanisms that
appellate courts have used to blaze their own trail through the
traditional principle.
A. WHAT IS “NEW EVIDENCE” ON APPEAL?
What is “new evidence” for purposes of this Article? The
basic definitions provide a starting point. First, evidence is
“[s]omething (including testimony, documents and tangible objects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged
fact.”56 In turn, a fact is “[s]omething that actually exists; an
aspect of reality.”57 For purposes of this piece, new evidence is
54. Davis, supra note 19.
55. MARVELL, supra note 16, at 165; see also Gorod, supra note 2, at 50–53
(noting “existential crisis” associated with conceding that appellate courts
make law, and that they consider new legislative facts in doing so).
56. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (9th ed. 2009).
57. Id. at 669. While a rich jurisprudential and philosophical literature
delves into the question of whether even adjudicative facts presented at trial
have any hope of revealing “reality,” see generally, e.g., Charles Nesson, The
Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985), this Article focuses on the problem of evidence as
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information regarding “an aspect of reality” that was not presented to the trial court, but that is presented to the appellate
court.
So defined, there are some categories of new evidence that
are intentionally excluded from the discussion below. The focus
of this Article is on evidence that could have been but was not
submitted to the trial court. This focus therefore excludes information regarding facts that may have changed in the period
between the trial court’s judgment and the appellate court’s
consideration; for instance, allegations that a case is moot on
appeal will often require an appellate court to consider what is
technically new evidence. Because the trial court could never
have considered that information, however, such evidence presents a different problem than is true for information that
could have been, but was not presented to the trial court.58
While there is some new evidence that is truly new—in the
sense that it could not have been presented to the trial court
because it was unavailable for legitimate reasons59—the problem of changed evidence is not the focus of this Article.60
Also excluded from consideration below is new evidence as
it is introduced into the record through Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(2) and state-level equivalents.61 When a party
managed by attorneys, courts, and parties.
58. See, e.g., Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 967 (3d Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (despite normal rule that the appellate court is “limited in our review to
those facts developed in the district court . . . . because mootness is a jurisdictional issue, we may receive facts relevant to that issue; otherwise there would
be no way to find out if an appeal has become moot”); see also Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1110 n.11 (10th Cir.
2010) (rejecting party’s effort to supplement the record in order to challenge a
finding of mootness because their argument (and evidence) was available to
them, but not made, at the trial court level). But see Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d
1108, 1114 (3d Cir. 1992) (supplementing record with information disproving
mootness where parties stipulated to the truth of the matter).
59. See generally Stuart M. Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River
Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269,
272 (1999) (discussing “the various choices available to appellate courts faced
with potentially outdated factual findings from a trial court,” including problems of mootness as well as changed facts in cases involving injunctions).
60. Because mootness raises jurisdictional issues, allowing new evidence
to be considered regarding mootness might be seen as a subset of those cases
that permit appellate courts to consider new evidence regarding their jurisdiction over the case. That broader point is discussed further infra.
61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60( b) (discussing circumstances in which a judgment may be vacated in order to address “newly discovered evidence that, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial”); OR. R. CIV. P. 71B(1)( b) (same). This type of evidence overlaps, but is
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seeks relief from judgment in light of new evidence, the resulting trial court ruling is generally reviewed on appeal for abuse
of discretion on whether the relief was properly granted (or
not). This is not new evidence on appeal; rather, it is evidence
that is now in the trial court’s record. The focus of this Article
is the situation where an appellate court considers and relies
upon new evidence in order to make its own determinations regarding a question presented on appeal—a situation that is
largely unmediated by the rules of appellate procedure.
Finally, new evidence for purposes of this Article does not
include evidence that was considered and relied upon by the
trial court, but was inadvertently left out of the formal record
below (because, for instance, the parties failed to either have
the evidence admitted or at least proffer the information).
While there are some exceptions (as noted infra), the general
understanding is that rules permitting supplementation of the
record on appeal are intended to “allow[] amendment of the
record on appeal only to correct inadvertent omissions, not to
introduce new evidence.”62 Such evidence is not, at least in the
sense of this Article, truly new because it was reviewed in the
trial court.
If a party does not seek supplementation of the record, but
the trial court decision nevertheless reveals information about
facts considered but not formally part of the record, an appellate court may choose to review the information revealed by the
trial court rulings without sidestepping the record review rule.
In Kimball Glassco Residential Center, Inc. v. Shanks,63 for instance, the Mississippi Supreme Court struck from the excerpts
of record on appeal copies of correspondence that were not
made part of the official record in the case.64 The Mississippi
Supreme Court agreed, based on discussion in the trial court
order, that the trial court had considered the correspondence,
but the parties did not seek to supplement the record and so
the copies of the correspondence were struck. Notably, however,
the court still considered the correspondence to the degree that
its content was revealed in the trial court order.65
not coextensive with, “changed” evidence on appeal. For instance, changed
facts that cause an appeal to become moot are generally not addressed via
Rule 60( b).
62. In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 388 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006); see also FED. R. APP. P. 10(e)(2).
63. 64 So. 3d 941 (Miss. 2011).
64. Id. at 945 n.3.
65. Id. This “back door” mechanism allowing review of information that
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In the end, when an appellate court considers information
relied upon by the trial court (whether that information was
part of the formal trial court record or not),66 the result is appellate court review of the same information presented to the
trial court, and this Article does not count it as new evidence on
appeal.
B. APPELLATE COURT CONSIDERATION OF NEW EVIDENCE ON
APPEAL
The exceptions to the traditional rule barring record review
can be characterized both by the type of new evidence being
considered, and by the method through which courts access
that evidence. The following look at appellate consideration of
new evidence on appeal is primarily arranged by method,
which permits something of a chronological evaluation of the
circumstances in which this information may be considered.67
Part II.B.4 deviates somewhat from this method-based list, focusing on the important distinction between adjudicative and
legislative facts. Adjudicative facts are specific to the parties
was presented to, but not made part of the formal record of, the trial court
proceeding, seems to be a particularly good example of the unnecessarily stark
“record worship” that Pound so vocally criticized. See POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 27. Where all parties agree that the information was reviewed and relied upon by the trial court, even if the particular evidence was
not formally submitted, it should be an easy case for supplementing the record
on appeal. For that reason, Kimball-Glassco is by no means the last word on
treatment of this kind of extra-record evidence. More typical is the outcome in
United States v. Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 1997), in which the court
of appeals allowed the record on appeal to be supplemented with segments of
depositions that “had been submitted to and considered by the [district] court”
but not added to the formal record. Id. Similarly, in Ross v. Kemp, the Eleventh Circuit allowed deposition material to be admitted to the record under
Rule 10(e) because (1) it had been considered at trial, and (2) both parties had
a valid belief that, under procedural rules in place at the time, the court clerk
would automatically file the depositions. 785 F.2d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1986).
66. See FED. R. APP. P. 10(e).
67. By focusing on the procedural mechanisms by which new evidence is
introduced to the appellate courts, I hope to articulate the full range of circumstances by which appellate courts accept (or generate) new evidence on
appeal. I do not explicitly theorize the circumstances in which new evidence
should or should not be considered, focusing instead on the counterintuitive
fact that it is.
Although done in the context of new arguments on appeal, Joan Steinman
has begun to articulate important theoretical grounds upon which this kind of
“new” information is appropriately considered by appellate courts. See Steinman, supra note 22 (manuscript at 5, 32–38, 44 –66). More remains to be done
in extending these considerations into the context of new evidence on appeal.
My thanks to Professor Steinman for her insights on this point.
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and circumstances connected with a particular case, while legislative facts involve conclusions about policy, technology, and
economics that may have had no reason to be discussed or even
anticipated at trial. As these examples demonstrate, appellate
courts regularly permit, and occasionally even invite, consideration of new evidence on appeal.
1. Simple Agreement
One of the most common ways in which new information is
conveyed to appellate courts is through the normal process of
communication with the appellate court: through briefs and
oral argument.68 Although these are, of course, formal modes of
communication, the process by which this information enters
the record is quite informal; it amounts to the quiet willingness
of parties and the court to consider specific facts that are helpful to the court’s analysis in the case, even if they fall outside
the scope of the formal lower court record.69 Appellate courts
take great advantage of this largely uncontrolled mechanism.70
As Thomas B. Marvell’s study of appellate processes showed, a
significant majority of appellate briefs and arguments, apparently relying on these principles, include discussions about
facts that are outside the scope of the record below.71
While this kind of sub silentio consideration of new evidence on appeal is common, it is rarely commented upon. As
Marvell notes, “written opinions are of no help, since judges
would not be expected to announce that they were influenced
by such facts.”72 Typically, such evidence is simply accepted
without comment.73 In the end, “appellate judges have and use
68. See MARVELL, supra note 16, at 70.
69. See id. at 162–67.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 164 –65 (noting that “counsel and the court quite often violated”
the record review rule since, out of the 112 appeals studied, “attorneys mentioned facts clearly outside the record in the great majority” of the appeals and
the courts regularly asked for (and received) information that was outside the
scope of the trial court record).
72. Id. at 165.
73. Judicial notice is not the answer. See FED. R. EVID. 201; discussion
infra Part II.B.4. As Marvell notes, much of this “new evidence”—whether
presented by the parties or considered sua sponte by the courts—is not an appropriate subject for judicial notice. See MARVELL, supra note 16, at 163
(“Facts used in . . . situations [where the court reads between the lines of the
record] certainly do not fall within the allowable limits of judicial notice.”); see
also id. at 161 (noting that awareness of judicial notice does not mean that
such restrictions are followed).
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considerable discretion as to whether they will use or ignore
supporting case facts not in the record and falling outside the
judicial notice restrictions.”74
Courts and commentators will occasionally suggest that
stipulation by the parties can permit a court to consider evidence that was not before the trial court. Thus, “the appellate
court has discretion to consider, in the interest of justice, a fact
not in the record that is conveyed by counsel during oral argument and not disputed by opposing counsel.”75 Furthermore, “a
statement of fact asserted in one party’s brief and conceded as
true in the opposing party’s brief may be considered as though
it appears in the record.”76 In essence, “if everyone agrees, and
we want to consider it, we will.” On the other hand, there is
plenty of case law supporting the traditional rule, under which
appellate courts will refuse to consider supplemental evidence
on appeal even when the parties are willing to stipulate to its
accuracy and to its inclusion in the appellate record.77 This perspective is entirely consistent with at least one of the rationales
behind the traditional record review rule: that principles of
economy justify requiring the trial court, not the court of appeals, to have the first shot at incorporating information into
the outcome of the case.78
Few courts attempt to reconcile these strains of analysis.79
Almost none offer any coherent discussion of the justification
for allowing new evidence in this kind of situation, or for the
contrary cases, declining to consider it.80 The closest some
courts come to offering specific justification for considering new
74. MARVELL, supra note 16, at 162.
75. MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 55–56.
76. In re Trust of Nitsche, 46 S.W.3d 682, 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (citing
Robinson v. Empiregas, Inc. of Hartville, 906 S.W.2d 829, 835 n.6 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995)).
77. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 213 n.4, 214 (11th Cir. 1997)
(refusing to permit the parties to supplement the record on appeal, even
though the parties stipulated to the new evidence, and rejecting the application of judicial notice to the stipulated facts); S&E Shipping Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 678 F.2d 636, 641 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that the district court may not supplement the record with stipulated information that
was not submitted and considered at trial); Panaview Door & Window Co. v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 255 F.2d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 1958) (“Matters which were
not before the trial court will be stricken on motion, even if they have been included in the record on appeal by stipulation.”).
78. See United States v. Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 1997).
79. See MARVELL, supra note 16, at 162 (documenting the uncertainty in
this area of law).
80. See id.
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evidence in this kind of situation is their reliance, discussed in
the next Section, on rules regarding supplementation of the
record and, more importantly, the inherent power of appellate
courts.81
2. Supplementing the Record and the Inherent Powers of the
Appellate Court
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e), as well as similar state law rules governing the supplementation of the record,
permit parties to correct “errors or omissions” in the trial court
record.82 The traditional application of this rule is to ensure
that the appellate court considers the same information that
the trial court considers, even if the formal record from the trial
court fails to accurately reflect what the trial court knew about
the case.83 As noted in the prior Sections, if material was considered by the trial court, the appellate court may, under these
rules, consider it as part of a “corrected” appellate record.84
Consistent with the traditional record review rule, however, the
standard interpretation of the rules holds that fairness and finality principles prevent parties from supplementing the record
with material that was neither filed with the trial court nor
brought to that court’s attention.85
As one practitioner noted, however, “[i]n addition to correction of the record, the court of appeals has the authority to
permit supplementation of the record.”86 This authority “either
is implicit in Rule 10(e) . . . or is part of the court’s inherent equitable powers.”87
81. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
82. See S&E Shipping Corp., 678 F.2d at 641.
83. See MARVELL, supra note 16.
84. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
85. See Henn v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 819 F.2d 824, 831 (7th Cir. 1987);
S&E Shipping Corp., 678 F.2d at 641 (“The purpose of . . . [Rule 10(e)] is to
allow the district court to correct omissions from or misstatements in the record for appeal, not to introduce new evidence in the court of appeals.”); United
States ex rel. Kellogg v. McBee, 452 F.2d 134, 137 (7th Cir. 1971).
86. Steven Richman, Record on Appeal and the Joint Appendix, in A
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 169, 174 (Anne Marie Lofaso
ed., 2010) (emphasis added).
87. Id.; see also 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION & RELATED MATTERS § 3956.4 (4th ed. 2008)
(“In special circumstances, a court of appeals may supplement the record to
add material not presented to the district court, though this is rare enough
that many of the decisions noting the court’s power to do so go on to say that
the power will not be exercised under the circumstances of the case. Because
Rule 10 does not in its terms provide for such supplementation, some courts
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has a
particularly rich line of cases to this effect. Consider, for instance, the court’s management of new evidence on appeal in
Schwartz v. Million Air, Inc.,88 a tort action involving an airplane crash in Ecuador. Some of the plaintiffs were on the
ground at the time of the crash and suffered serious injuries.89
It was later discovered, however, that some of the many plaintiffs had falsified their medical records and that they had, in
fact, not been injured in the crash.90 The defendant moved to
dismiss the claims and to award fees and costs, and the district
court granted the motion.91
On appeal, the remaining victims and their attorneys
“moved to supplement the record to include exhibits from the
case files of their former clients. These exhibits include[d] photocopies of the altered medical records.”92 The court decided to
permit the evidence:
We rarely supplement the record to include material that was not before the district court, but we have the equitable power to do so if it is
in the interests of justice. We decide on a case-by-case basis whether
an appellate record should be supplemented. Even when the added
material will not conclusively resolve an issue on appeal, we may allow supplementation in the aid of making an informed decision. 93

The court also permitted the parties to supplement the record
with substitute versions of documents that had been submitted
at trial.94 The trial copies were not particularly clear, while the
ones submitted in the motion to supplement were “clearer
copies.”95
Overall, the court concluded, the additional evidence—the
new evidence on appeal—provided the court “with a better understanding of the information Appellants possessed at the
time these cases were pending.”96 The court therefore granted
the motion to supplement.97
state that it constitutes an exercise of inherent power.”).
88. 341 F.3d 1220, 1223–26 (11th Cir. 2003).
89. Id. at 1223.
90. Id. at 1223–24.
91. Id. at 1224.
92. Id. at 1225 n.4.
93. Id. (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325,
1330 (11th Cir. 2000); Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1555
(11th Cir. 1989)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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For those familiar with the appellate process and the record review rule, the entire exercise is rather shocking. The rule
is that information not presented in the trial court is outside
the record on appeal, regardless of whether new information
might provide a better understanding.98 Yet, the Eleventh Circuit was more than willing to consider the information.99
In order to justify its willingness to go beyond the trial
court record, the Eleventh Circuit relies primarily on what it
characterizes as its “inherent equitable authority” to supplement the record on appeal with material that was not before
the district court.100 In deciding whether to exercise that authority, the circuit considers three factors: (1) whether allowing
the evidence would resolve the issue, (2) whether “remanding
the case to the district court for consideration of the additional
material would . . . be[] ‘contrary to both the interests of justice
and the efficient use of judicial resources,’” and (3) whether the
case is a habeas corpus proceeding.101
The Eleventh Circuit is not alone in its occasional willingness to supplement the record with new evidence. The Second
Circuit also asserts expansive authority to supplement the record (although it does so by implementing a broader reading of
10(e) rather than by relying on an inherent authority).102 The
Eighth Circuit allowed new evidence into the record before considering a motion for a preliminary injunction in a trademark
infringement suit based on “interests of justice” concerns.103
According to the Eighth Circuit, because the district court only
considered one of the trademarks when denying the motion
when, in fact, three trademarks were at issue, it was necessary
to consider all of them after finding that “misrepresentation[s]”

98. See MARVELL, supra note 16, at 157–59.
99. See, e.g., Schwartz, 341 F.3d at 1225 n.4.
100. See Ross v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 1467, 1474 (11th Cir. 1986).
101. Id. at 1475 (quoting Dickerson v. Alabama, 667 F.2d 1364, 1367 (11th
Cir. 1982)); see also Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d, 1163, 1168,
1170–71 (11th Cir. 2006) ( permitting new evidence on appeal regarding the
issue of standing). However, these factors are guidelines, meaning they are not
always used in each case. Ross, 785 F.2d at 1475.
102. United States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 1980) (relying on a
prior version of Rule 10(e)); see also Ross, 785 F.2d at 1476 n.16 (recognizing
that the Second Circuit relied on Rule 10(e) to supplement the record).
103. Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 988 F.2d 61, 63 (8th
Cir. 1993).
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of facts by the appellee had left the district court with an “incomplete picture of the [alleged] infringement.”104
As support for its exercise of this inherent authority to
supplement, the Eleventh Circuit relies on the Supreme Court’s
flexibility regarding the rules governing preservation.105 In
Singleton v. Wulff, the Supreme Court held:
The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the
first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts
of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. We announce no general rule. Certainly there are circumstances in which a
federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on
below, as where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt . . . or
where “injustice might otherwise result.”106

As noted above, the rule regarding record review is tightly connected with the traditional rules of preservation.107 It is not
surprising that the Eleventh Circuit saw in the Singleton language some room suggesting that flexibility regarding new arguments might also be applied to new facts supporting those
arguments. It is not clear, however, whether the Supreme
Court would be as generous in its application of the statement
to supplementation of the factual record. Unlike consideration
of arguments, to which the language in Singleton is targeted,
consideration of new evidence would appear to be a special
case, particularly given the general understanding about the
trial court’s specialization in the world of fact-finding, as well
as principles of comity (which generally call for the trial court
to be the first judicial entity to consider the effect of particular
facts on the case).108 That said, as discussed above, there really
is very little positive law upon which the Supreme Court (or

104. Id.; see also More Light Invs. v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 415 Fed.
App’x 1, 2 (9th Cir. 2011) (denying the motion to strike new evidence from excerpts of record since “this is the extraordinary case in which the documents
are helpful to the court and are not prejudicial to either party”); Acumed LLC
v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199 (3rd Cir. 2009) (“[ I ]n exceptional circumstances a court of appeals may allow a party to supplement the
record on appeal.”).
105. See Ross, 785 F.2d at 1475 n.15.
106. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (quoting Hormel v.
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)).
107. See discussion supra Part I.B.
108. Comity is a “practice among political entities (as nations, states, or
courts of different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 303 (9th ed.
2009). For a discussion of the principles of comity, see 21 C.J.S Courts § 307
(2012).
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courts of appeal) might rely in order to give guidance regarding
the appropriate consideration of new evidence on appeal.109
At least some state appellate courts similarly rely on inherent powers in allowing themselves to consider new evidence
on appeal. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for instance, held
that “[a]lthough an appellate court is ordinarily limited to a
consideration of matters contained in the record before it, we
think it has inherent power to look beyond the record where the
orderly administration of justice commends it.”110
What lesson can we take from the willingness of these
courts to exercise largely unconstrained authority to consider
non-record evidence? Although the Conclusion returns to this
issue, the range of cases allowing new evidence on appeal
should suggest that, at least in some situations, the record review rule is not as monolithic as the traditional view suggests.
These cases strongly suggest that there is room for flexibility at
the appellate level, as long as considering new evidence on appeal serves the broader goals of ensuring the rapid (but nevertheless fair) resolution of the appeal or addressing impermissible strategic behavior by parties in the courts below.
3. Consideration of Jurisdictional Facts
The next significant means by which new evidence on appeal may be used is in an appellate court’s effort to resolve
questions about jurisdiction. Almost without exception, appellate courts are willing to consider new evidence regarding jurisdictional matters, even if (and especially if) the jurisdictional
concerns were not raised in the courts below.111 Although nothing would prevent appellate courts from remanding a case to
the trial court in order to resolve a particularly complex factual
dispute relating to jurisdiction,112 it is quite common for courts
to consider new evidence at the appellate level—whether provided by attorneys or independently researched by the court
itself.
109. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
110. Crystal Beach Bay Ass’n v. Koochiching Cnty., 243 N.W.2d 40, 43
(Minn. 1976) (citing Baker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1946)).
111. See infra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Aloe Vera of Am., Inc. v. United States, 580 F.3d 867, 873
(9th Cir. 2009) (remanding for factual determinations regarding subject matter jurisdiction); United States v. Ceja-Prado, 333 F.3d 1046, 1051–52 (9th Cir.
2003) (same); E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925,
938–39 (2d Cir. 1998) (same).

2040

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:2016

For example, in Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Market Place, L.L.C.,113 the Seventh Circuit (which is well-known
for being particularly attentive to issues of subject-matter jurisdiction)114 stated that while “exploring” the question of diversity jurisdiction before oral argument, it discovered that one
of the corporate entities in the case was likely non-diverse visà-vis the defendants.115 Rather than remand for further findings, the court ordered the parties to provide supplemental
briefing on the subject of diversity jurisdiction and ultimately
concluded that such jurisdiction was lacking.116 Although the
decision in Belleville does not reference any authority permitting the court to consider this new evidence on appeal, the circuit has, in other cases, referenced 28 U.S.C. § 1653 and interpreted it as allowing, for purposes of considering whether
diversity jurisdiction exists, submission of affidavits supplying
non-record information regarding citizenship.117 Similarly, the
Fifth Circuit has noted, in the context of determining whether
an appeal was filed in a timely manner, that “this court has the
discretionary power to order supplementation of the record on
appeal, and may do so ‘of its own initiative.’”118
Most, though not all, state courts apply similar principles.
By statute, Texas provides that “[e]ach court of appeals may, on
affidavit or otherwise, as the court may determine, ascertain
113. 350 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2003).
114. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. R. 28(a) ( providing extensive direction to parties regarding the content of the jurisdictional statement required by parties under
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4)). In particular, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of the
Seventh Circuit (who is the author of the opinion in Belleville) is “regarded as
a stickler for adhering closely to jurisdictional limitations on the power of
courts.” M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1027
(2010).
115. Belleville, 350 F.3d at 692.
116. The court’s dissatisfaction with the work of counsel on the jurisdictional question was represented by its conclusion that
[t]he best way for counsel to make the litigants whole is to perform,
without additional fees, any further services that are necessary to
bring this suit to a conclusion in state court, or via settlement. That
way the clients will pay just once for the litigation. This is intended
not as a sanction, but simply to ensure that clients need not pay for
lawyers’ time that has been wasted for reasons beyond the clients’
control.
Id. at 694.
117. See 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (2006); Stockman v. LaCroix, 790 F.2d 584, 587
(7th Cir. 1986).
118. In re GHR Energy Corp., 791 F.2d 1200, 1202 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing
Dickerson v. Alabama, 667 F.2d 1364, 1367 (5th Cir. 1982)).
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the matters of fact that are necessary to the proper exercise of
its jurisdiction.”119 On the other hand, the Idaho Supreme
Court insists that when sitting “in an appellate capacity . . . we
are bound to consider only the record and cannot find facts during our inquiry into whether we have jurisdiction to review [the
administrative decision below].”120 Given its adherence to the
record review rule, in the face of a significant jurisdictional
question, the court will remand the case for further consideration.121 Idaho is somewhat unusual; as long as the facts at issue
are not complex, most courts view their jurisdictional limits as
sufficient justification for considering new evidence on appeal.122
As a general matter, courts are quite willing to consider
new evidence on appeal when evaluating questions of jurisdiction.123 In such cases, this willingness to deviate from the record review rule is rooted in an apparent belief that, in circumstances presenting relatively straightforward jurisdictional
questions, any benefits associated with a strict adherence to
the rule would be outweighed by the cost of remanding the case
for further proceedings.124 Once again, as with the exercise of
inherent power noted in the prior Section, the record review
rule in these cases is brushed aside by other, apparently more
practical, considerations.
4. A Definitional Interlude: Legislative Facts, Judicial Notice,
and the Record Review Principle
The facts considered on appeal in the prior examples are
generally (although not exclusively) adjudicative. The next four
119. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.220(c) (West 2011); see Bloom v. Bloom,
935 S.W.2d 942, 943–45 (Tex. App. 1996) (considering affidavit provided on
appeal alleging that wife had accepted substantial benefits under divorce decree, and seeking application of “acceptance of benefits” doctrine to bar appellate court jurisdiction).
120. In re City of Shelley, 255 P.3d 1175, 1180 (Idaho 2011).
121. Cf. id. (emphasizing the degree to which an appellate court is precluded from finding its own facts).
122. See supra notes 113–21 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 113–21 and accompanying text.
124. The court may be particularly concerned with the costs associated
with establishing jurisdiction, as demonstrated by Judge Easterbrook’s lament
in Stockman that
[w]e have now done what the parties and the district court should
have done—established that there is complete diversity. The exercise
has consumed the time of two teams of lawyers and three judges. It
could have been done more quickly had it been done right in the first
place.
Stockman v. LaCroix, 790 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1986).
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examples involve situations in which the courts, especially the
U.S. Supreme Court and state courts of last resort, find themselves considering what is typically (though not always) new
legislative evidence on appeal.125 Before discussing those exceptions, however, the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts, and the role that judicial notice rules play in judicial consideration of these facts, should be reviewed in more
detail.
a. Adjudicative vs. Legislative Facts
The initial distinction between legislative and adjudicative
fact was first made in Kenneth Culp Davis’s seminal article on
the use of evidence by administrative agencies.126 In that article, Davis pointed out that
[w]hen an agency finds facts concerning immediate parties—what the
parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background conditions were—the agency is performing an adjudicative function, and
the facts may conveniently be called adjudicative facts. When an
agency wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is acting legislatively, just as judges have created the common law through judicial
legislation, and the facts which inform its legislative judgment may
conveniently be denominated legislative facts.127

The term adjudicative fact has largely settled into common
usage,128 and refers simply to “the facts of the particular
case.”129 It is possible to divide adjudicative facts into two further categories: historical facts (which address “who did what,
when and where, and whether with or without a defined state
of mind”)130 and “interpretive” or “evaluative” facts (which are
addressed to question “whether what was done violated a legal
standard for evaluating conduct.”)131
Legislative facts encompass information that is factual, in
the sense that it is amenable to proof of some kind, but that is
not directly related to the facts of a given case.132 Legislative
125. See Gorod, supra note 2, at 34 –35, 46–48 (discussing examples in
which the U.S. Supreme Court and intermediate federal appellate courts relied on the use of legislative facts).
126. Davis, supra note 19, at 402–10; see also See, supra note 9, at 195
(“Legislative facts are those relevant to the court’s thinking about what the
law ought to be instead of what the facts of the case are.”).
127. Davis, supra note 19, at 402–03.
128. Mass. Med. Soc’y v. Dukakis, 637 F. Supp. 684, 689 (D. Mass. 1986).
129. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s notes.
130. Mass. Med. Soc’y, 637 F. Supp. at 691.
131. Id.
132. See id.
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facts encompass information that is “descriptive, and sometimes predictive, information about the larger world.”133
Commentators use terms other than “legislative fact” to
describe this class of information. One of the few judicial opinions that struggled intensively with the distinctions between
legislative and adjudicative facts instead chose the term “nonadjudicative facts” to refer to the full scope of factual material
that did not directly bear on the parties in the case and their
behavior.134 In his study of appellate courts and counsel, Marvell used the term “social facts,” both because he was concerned
that Davis’s definition had been used in an insufficiently rigorous manner, and because he believed that the surveys he was
conducting would be clearer with the term “social facts.”135 In
Marvell’s lexicon, historical adjudicative facts became “case
facts,” while interpretive adjudicative facts were “supporting
case facts.”136 Although at least some commentators use Marvell’s term,137 this Article uses the term legislative facts because the bulk of the legal commentary on this issue does so as
well.138
b. Judicial Notice and Legislative Facts
The distinction between legislative and adjudicative fact is
important because, as Davis noted, the rules of evidence (when
Davis wrote in 1942, they were merely proposed rules)139 were
primarily designed to address the use of adjudicative fact and
do not easily carry over to consideration of legislative facts.140
In particular, Federal Rule of Evidence 201, governing judicial
notice, applies only to judicial notice of adjudicative facts.141

133. Gorod, supra note 2, at 39.
134. Mass. Med. Soc’y, 637 F. Supp. at 689.
135. MARVELL, supra note 16, at 139 & 339–40 n.2.
136. Id. at 139. Marvell further distinguished between “facts about the dispute only” that were used for the purpose of lawmaking (“case facts used as
social facts”), and facts about more than the dispute (“social facts”). Id.
137. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts
Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 72 (2008).
138. On the general difficulty of defining legislative fact, see 21B CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 5103.2 (2d ed. 2005).
139. See Davis, supra note 19, at 405.
140. See id.
141. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) (“This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.”).

2044

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:2016

The rule is intentionally silent regarding judicial notice of legislative facts that bear on questions of law or policy.142
The decision to leave a wide range of facts outside of the
scope of the judicial review rule recognizes that there are some
facts that courts (or, for that matter, juries) must have in order
to be able to do their job, but that cannot, as a practical matter,
be deemed either beyond reasonable dispute or introduced
through the adversarial process.143 Courts engaged in the process of interpreting the law need to be able to consider “the factual ingredients of problems of what the law ought to be”144
without being required to seek that information solely through
the offerings of parties at trial, or in the hands of otherwise unquestionably accurate sources.145 In addition, “every case involves the use of hundreds or thousands of non-evidence
facts”146 that could not reasonably be introduced into evidence,
even if the parties were to try.147
In sum, legislative facts in the federal system are generally
not subject to the judicial notice rule. Although one might think
that this means that judicial notice of such information is impermissible, as it is simply outside the scope of the rules altogether, the assumption has been that legislative facts can be
considered by trial courts without going through formal evidentiary processes, and without that information being indisputable as a practical matter.148 The lack of guidance, in other
words, is interpreted to be a free-for-all.149 Thus, parties may
offer legislative facts as evidence,150 and trial courts are enti142. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s notes.
143. See id.
144. See id. (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of Judicial Notice
Based on Fairness and Convenience, in PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 69, 83 (Roscoe
Pound et al. eds., 1964)).
145. See id.
146. Id. (citing Davis, supra note 144, at 73).
147. See id.
148. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) (outlining the scope of judicial notice).
149. Dissatisfied with this lack of guidance, some states modified their judicial notice statutes to cover both adjudicative and legislative fact. See
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 138, at § 5103.2 n.9 (noting examples of Indiana, Alaska, and Montana). As discussed below, however, the extension of the
rule to legislative fact is unlikely to have had a significant effect on judicial
decision making. See infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
150. There are many significant recent examples in which the trial courts
took extensive evidence regarding the legislative facts underlying the adoption
of the legal principles at issue. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, for instance, the
parties offered, and the trial court made extensive factual findings regarding,
a wide range of testimony amounting to legislative facts regarding the mar-
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tled to consider that information, or even to do their own research in order to resolve their own legislative fact questions.151
Appellate courts must be able to consider legislative facts
as well; after all, “legislative facts are particularly conducive to
the appellate courts’ task of considering normative values when
creating new law.”152 As with trial courts, however, there is
very little guidance regarding (a) the use of such information on
appeal, (b) how, where, and when to find it,153 and (c) the role
that the record review principle plays in appellate consideration of such facts. A default approach to managing questions of
legislative fact might involve simply remanding a case to the
trial court for the development of legislative facts in appropriate cases.154 As the remainder of Part II notes, however, this
choice is a rare one;155 far more common is a willingness by appellate courts to consider new evidence on legislative facts at
every turn, generally with very little attention to the role that
the new information has in the case, the quality of that information, or the effect that its consideration has on the appellate
process generally.156

riage of homosexual men and women, and the ban on such marriage imposed
by California’s Proposition 8. See 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 956–91 (N.D. Cal.
2010); see also Mass. Med. Soc’y v. Dukakis, 637 F. Supp. 684, 692 (D. Mass.
1986) (concluding that parties could present legislative facts, and the court
could consider those facts or legislative facts generated through its own
research).
151. See Mass. Med. Soc’y, 637 F. Supp. at 692; infra Part II.B.8.
152. See A.J. Stephani, Theraputic Jurisprudence in the Appellate Arena:
Judicial Notice and the Potential of the Legislative Fact Remand, 24 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 509, 510 (2000).
153. STERN, supra note 17, § 10.12, at 278 (2d ed. 1989) (“Judges and commentators have been aware that this does not provide courts with much guidance as to how and where to find reliable legislative factual information.”).
154. See Davis, supra note 19, at 403 & n.79 (citing Borden’s Farm Products, Inc. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934) (remanding for development of legislative facts)). Some commentators have argued for a much more vigorous application of this approach. Stephani, supra note 152.
155. See Davis, supra note 9, at 9 (noting that legislative fact remand “has
failed to take hold, perhaps because the procedure is especially awkward”).
156. An interesting question, beyond the scope of this Article, is what
standard of review appellate courts should use in reviewing trial court (or, for
that matter, congressional) findings regarding legislative facts. Because the
scenario under consideration in this article presumes that there were no relevant findings in the trial court ( because there was no evidence), we need not
address the problem here. Cf. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 137, at 76–81
(discussing the standard of review used by the Supreme Court in examining
congressional findings).
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c. Judicial Notice and New Evidence on Appeal
In light of the above discussion, it should not be surprising
that the judicial notice rule does little to justify the use of new
evidence on appeal that is discussed in the first three examples
regarding simple agreement, supplementing the record, and
consideration of jurisdictional facts. First, in most of these examples, the facts at issue would not fit within the scope of the
judicial notice rule because they remain specific to the parties
and are not “generally known” or capable of being “accurately
and readily determined” by reference to indisputably accurate
sources.157
Second, the judicial notice rule says nothing about whether
judicially noticed evidence can be considered by appellate
courts for the first time on appeal.158 While appellate courts
certainly do take judicial notice of some information, it is not at
all uncommon for them to nevertheless refuse to consider that
information if it was not presented to the trial court in the first
instance.159 With a few limited exceptions, judicial notice principles do not provide a clear basis for appellate courts to rely
upon in considering new evidence on appeal. As one practitioner noted, judicial notice
is not an opportunity to second-guess the trial court. The appellate
court may take judicial notice of appropriate items as permitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, but will not do so if the item was
previously available but counsel, for tactical reasons, chose not to put
it before the trial court.160

The point is illustrated by the California Court of Appeals’
decision in Hahn v. Diaz-Barba.161 Adhering to the preservation rule, the California Court of Appeals refused to take judicial notice of provisions of Mexican law (though such information would generally be subject to judicial notice),
concluding that “[r]eviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court. Rather,
normally when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s
judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which
157. See FED. R. EVID. 201( b).
158. See id. 201.
159. As discussed infra, even if parties stipulate to particular facts, they
are not free of the rule requiring that those facts be presented to the district
court in the first instance. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
160. Richman, supra note 86, at 175 (comparing In re American Biomaterials Corp., 954 F.2d 919, 922 (3d Cir. 1992), with Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Leb.)
S.A.L., 838 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1988)).
161. Hahn v. Diaz-Barba, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
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were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered.”162
Judicial notice on appeal of new legislative facts faces similar problems. Even if the judicial notice rule were to be applied
to legislative facts (and it is, in some cases),163 it would generally bar consideration of these facts, since very few of them are
indisputable.164 Furthermore, the record review problem remains: even if judicial notice of new information were appropriate, record review and preservation principles would (as in
Hahn) often interfere with the appellate court’s ability and
willingness to consider that new evidence on appeal.
d. Appellate Reliance on New Evidence of Legislative Facts
There is, therefore, no specific ground upon which appellate courts can rely in considering new evidence regarding legislative facts. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that appellate
courts do consider it.165 “One may safely venture the guess that
over the centuries the judges who have produced our vast body
of common law have not limited their deliberations to facts of
record and facts which are ‘obvious and notorious’ or ‘of indisputable accuracy,’ within the narrow boundaries of judicial notice.”166 The U.S. Supreme Court’s “implicit or explicit determination of social facts has been essential to many well known
holdings.”167
There are many examples of situations in which new evidence is considered by appellate courts in determining legislative facts. In his original article defining the nature of legislative facts, Davis discussed several examples from the U.S.
Supreme Court, as well as from state supreme courts.168 Thirty
years later, in his lecture published in Minnesota Law Review,
162. Id. at 256.
163. See FED. R. EVID. 201(a).
164. See id. 201 advisory committee’s note (“[Legislative f ]acts most needed
in thinking about difficult problems of law and policy have a way of being outside the domain of the clearly indisputable.”) (citing Davis, supra note 144, at
82); Davis, supra note 19, at 403 (noting the disputability of most legislative
facts).
165. Mass. Med. Soc’y v. Dukakis 637 F. Supp. 684, 692 (D. Mass 1986)
(noting that “an appellate court, in its decisionmaking, is not confined to the
record of evidence presented to the trial court,” but rather, may consider “additional sources” of evidence, including “independent library research”).
166. Davis, supra note 19.
167. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 137, at 72.
168. Davis, supra note 19, at 403–06.
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Davis identified yet more.169 The “use of ‘legislative fact’ in constitutional litigation is so common that one could cite any of a
number of Supreme Court decisions.”170 In Ballew v. Georgia,
for instance, the Court considered whether a five-person state
criminal jury provided the necessary constitutional protection.171 In conducting that review, Justice Blackmun’s plurality
opinion examined “a quantity of scholarly work” regarding the
effect of jury size on the quality of the decision; notably, much
of that work had been generated in response to earlier Court
decisions on jury size.172 Almost without exception, the Court’s
consideration of the results of these new studies amounted to
reliance on new evidence on appeal.173
The Court is not unaware of the difficulties posed by the
use of legislative facts. Justice Harry Blackmun, whose opinions regularly relied to a great degree on legislative facts as
found by his own studies, once noted that the Court “face[s] institutional limitations on [its] ability to gather information
about ‘legislative facts.’”174 Chief Justice Warren Burger conceded that the truth of facts as to legislative or policy matters
“cannot be tested by conventional judicial processes.”175
This tension between the regular use of legislative facts
and the procedural limitations associated with considering
them is echoed in the academic literature. Professor Davis, for
instance, argued that “[m]uch of our law is based on wrong assumptions about legislative facts,” and complained that “[n]o
one has planned the present system under which the procedure
of appellate courts, designed for adjudication of questions of
law, is used for a large portion of all the lawmaking that is

169. Davis, supra note 9, at 9–10.
170. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 138.
171. 435 U.S. 223, 224 (1978) ( plurality opinion).
172. Id. at 232–39. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment alone, believing that the studies did not prove the majority’s point—thus proving the point
that most legislative facts are themselves subject to dispute. See id. at 246
(Powell, J., concurring).
173. See, e.g., id. at 224 ( plurality opinion) (noting that the primary issue
at trial was certainly guilt or innocence—petitioner was accused of distributing obscene materials—rather than an academic discussion regarding the
effect of jury size on its deliberations).
174. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 927 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
175. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that legislative action is preferable when the dispute is rooted in factual claims that “cannot be tested” by judicial process).
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done in the whole society. No one would plan such a system.”176
By contrast, John McGinnis and Charles Mulaney were more
enthusiastic about the role of courts in evaluating legislative
facts; they even suggested that the courts are just as wellpositioned as legislatures in evaluating the validity of legislative facts because courts, unlike legislatures, have experience
as an unbiased adjudicator engaged in an effort to dispassionately evaluate the various factual claims that are made in most
disputes regarding legislative fact.177
With this grounding in the underlying principles and problems associated with the judicial consideration of legislative
fact, we are in a better position to consider the final four mechanisms by which appellate courts are introduced to new evidence on appeal.
5. “Brandeis Briefs” and Legislative Facts on the Merits
In seeking a court’s approval for a new proposition of law,
or in defending (or attacking) a legislative action as unconstitutional, parties will often need to rely upon references to social,
political, economic, and technical facts.178 Unless the proposition of law in question was a significant issue at trial, parties
often find that the first real opportunity to present this evidence to the courts is in their appellate brief on the merits.
Prior to becoming a Supreme Court justice, Louis Brandeis
was a respected, progressive attorney who was particularly
well-known for writing just this kind of policy-oriented brief.179
The prototypical “Brandeis brief” was the merits brief he drafted for the State in Muller v. Oregon.180 In order to defend the
validity of Oregon’s law limiting the work hours of women,
Brandeis included in his brief on the merits an exhaustive discussion of the economic and social science literature, all intended to demonstrate that the State’s legislation was an “appropriate and legitimate” effort to protect the health and safety of
female workers. The brief included well over 100 pages of discussion about industrial studies.181 In ruling for Brandeis’s client, the Supreme Court reasoned that taking judicial notice of
176. Davis, supra note 9, at 15, 7.
177. See McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 137, at 73.
178. See Margolis, supra note 9, at 210–13.
179. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 201–27 (2009).
180. 208 U.S. 412 (1908); see also UROFSKY, supra note 179, at 212–19 (describing development of the brief ).
181. UROFSKY, supra note 179, at 212–19.
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“expressions of opinions from other than judicial sources” could
be an aid to their understanding of the case.182 This was true
even though the information cited by Brandeis was subject to
dispute, and even though none of the information had been introduced at the trial level.183
Brandeis’s success in Muller guaranteed that his extrarecord, social science-laden brief—the first Brandeis brief—
would be modeled in a number of subsequent cases.184 Almost
by definition, those briefs rely heavily on the use of social science information that was probably not introduced in the trial
court, and which would, if it had been presented in the trial
court, likely have been disputed.185 Nevertheless, the Brandeis
brief is a widely accepted model for merits briefing in cases that
present significant policy questions. Even Kenneth Davis, who
was quite critical of the unconstrained use of new evidence on
appeal by courts, argued that “Brandeis briefs should be encouraged; the Court now welcomes them, but not many are
filed.”186
Despite the long history of new evidence in Brandeis briefs,
appellate litigator Robert Stern has noted that the use of new
evidence in appellate briefs is no guarantee that it will be considered, given the record review rule:
Just when in a particular litigation legislative facts can be so established, or whether the safer course would be to include them in a trial
record, is a matter for the judgment of the litigating lawyer in the
first instance. I suspect that the Brandeis brief technique is often employed by lawyers newly brought in on appeal, after it is too late to introduce the facts into the trial court record.187

182. Muller, 208 U.S. at 419.
183. UROFSKY, supra note 179, at 214 –16 (noting the research work that
was conducted in order provide Brandeis with the necessary facts, as well as
the general record review rule); id. at 221–22 (noting significant technical and
scientific problems that have been identified in the original Brandeis brief );
see also STERN, supra note 17, § 10.12, at 279 (“[F ]acts not of record which one
party might call to a court’s attention might not necessarily be indisputable on
their face or by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably
questioned.”).
184. UROFSKY, supra note 179, at 219 (noting use of such a brief in Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 –95 & n.11 (1954)).
185. Id.; see also STERN, supra note 17, § 10.12, at 279.
186. Davis, supra note 9, at 15; see also Margolis, supra note 9, at 219 (arguing for the use of legislative fact in merits briefing).
187. STERN, supra note 17, § 10.12, at 279.
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Stern identifies an important problem of timing. Presenting legislative facts at trial is both possible and preferred,188
and parties who can anticipate the need for legislative facts in
their litigation may well be able to offer evidence regarding
them at trial.189 Nevertheless, the focus of an appellate case is
often quite different than the focus at trial, and if the need for
legislative facts is not apparent at the trial level, no choice remains but to offer new evidence on appeal.
The primary concern associated with the use of the evidence presented in these briefs is the lack of vetting through
the normal evidentiary process in the trial court and subsequent reliance, by both counsel and court, on erroneous conclusions or bad research.190 The public nature of merits briefing,
along with the back-and-forth of filing answering and reply
briefs, can help alleviate these concerns. For that reason, courts
relying on merits briefs may be on more solid factual ground
than if they were researching legislative facts on their own.191
In the end, however, there can be no guarantee that appellate
consideration of new evidence will reach accurate conclusions.
The best cure for error is for the court to set forth, in its opinion, those facts upon which it is relying, as well as the source(s)
of those facts. If subsequent analysis reveals factual errors,
such a transparent opinion should ensure that the effect of
those errors on the decision will be apparent.
6. Amicus Briefs as a Source of New Evidence on Appeal
Although briefs filed by parties can be a source of new information, it is briefs filed by nonparties that have proved to be
a particularly significant source of new evidence on appeal. The
amicus brief has become an important part of appellate prac188. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 9, at 11. Davis notes that
[w]hen legislative facts are needed for a sound decision, a trial court
can do better than an appellate court, because it is free to take evidence on questions of legislative facts. Some trial courts do so, with
creditable results. Even so, I have to point out that the normal evidence-taking process may be a total misfit for legislative facts.
Id. (citing as an example Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224,
243 n.50 (5th Cir. 1976) (excluding relevant and important legislative facts as
hearsay)).
189. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932–938 (N.D.
Cal. 2010) (detailing the evidence introduced in the trial court concerning the
legislative intent regarding California’s gay marriage initiative).
190. See Margolis, supra note 9, at 232.
191. See infra Part II.B.8 (discussing independent research by judges as a
source of new evidence).
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tice, particularly before the U.S. Supreme Court,192 and as one
recent article noted, “in many instances the Court has not confined its review to evidence introduced in the district court, instead relying on evidence submitted by amicus briefs at the
Supreme Court level.”193
More than any other type of brief filed at an appellate
court, those drafted by amici contain a significant portion of
new evidence. Amici are newcomers to the case, and because
they were typically not involved at the trial court level, they
may feel particularly unconstrained by the record review
rule.194 In addition, because amici often have specialized
knowledge and interests on the matters presented in a case,
they are often a particularly rich source for new evidence on
appeal.195
The resulting reliance on amicus briefs is entirely consistent with their historic purpose. “The role of the original
[Roman] amicus was to provide a court with legal information
that was beyond its notice or expertise.”196 This historical responsibility is still a very important function:
Informing the Court is not limited to a restatement of record facts,
but includes relating other circumstances that should be considered
in resolving the controversy. Amici can supply nonrecord facts of
which the court may take judicial notice. . . . This function, that of

192. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus
Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PENN. L. REV. 743, 744 (2000)
(noting that, in “recent years,” amicus briefs were filed in nearly eighty-five
percent of the U.S. Supreme Court’s argued cases); id. at 751–57.
193. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 137, at 82.
194. See REAGAN WILLIAM SIMPSON & MARY VASALY, THE AMICUS BRIEF:
HOW TO WRITE IT AND USE IT EFFECTIVELY 31 (ABA ed., 3d ed. 2010) (“The
facts an amicus intends to present may not be contained in the record of the
case, and may extend beyond the facts of the particular case at issue.”). As
representatives of constituencies who will be affected not by the judgment, but
by the precedential value of the court’s decision in the case, amici are particularly interested in communicating with the court on broad policy issues (which
require the use of legislative facts). See SCOTT A. COMPARATO, AMICI CURIAE
AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN STATE SUPREME COURTS 62–65, 105–110 (2003)
(noting that amici briefs may provide more and/or different information than
is contained in litigant briefs).
195. See, e.g., PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT 70–
71 (2008) (describing a number of cases in which amici presented the Court
with additional evidence that would not have been presented in the trial
court); SIMPSON & VASALY, supra note 194, at 35 (noting role of “expert”
amici).
196. REAGAN WILLIAM SIMPSON & MARY R. VASALY, THE AMICUS BRIEF:
HOW TO BE A GOOD FRIEND OF THE COURT 1 (ABA ed., 2d ed. 2004) .
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supplementing the record to help persuade the Court, is still one of
the amicus’s most important role[s].197

It should come as no surprise, then, that the Supreme
Court may rely heavily on amicus briefs as support for “factual
contentions that were not introduced in the adversarial proceedings in the lower court.”198 McGinnis and Mulaney point
out, for instance, that in Grutter v. Bollinger (addressing the
validity of the University of Michigan’s diversity admissions
program),199 the Court “relied on factual assertions in the amicus briefs . . . in finding that diversity in education is a compelling state interest, although these claims had never been subject to cross examination or other procedural scrutiny.”200
Thus, while the information in amicus briefs often includes
the same kind of legislative facts that one finds in Brandeis
briefs,201 the outsider status of amici may lead them to present
197. John Howard, Retaliation, Reinstatement, and Friends of the Court:
Amicus Participation in Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 31 HOW. L.J. 241,
253–54, 255–56 (1988).
198. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 137, at 82. Amicus briefs are also
valuable to the Court at the petition stage because they provide additional information about which interest groups believe a particular case is important,
and why. See COLLINS, supra note 195, at 29 (noting that, according to one
study, the presence of amici in support of a petition for certiorari was one of
the three most important factors governing whether the Court would grant the
petition); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping out the Strategic Terrain: The
Informational Role of Amici Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING:
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 215, 221–22 (Cornell W. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (amicus briefs provide the court with information
allowing the justices to make “precise calculations” regarding the nature of the
political environment). The effect of such information is debatable; some commentators believe that amicus briefs are most significant because of the information they convey regarding interest group attention to a case, not because of “new evidence” or legal arguments. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note
192, at 782–86 (describing the “interest group” model of amicus influence on
the Supreme Court). Notably, Kearney and Merrill’s study of amicus brief influence at the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the “legal model” of such
influence—the one that presumes the importance of “new . . . background factual material” and “‘Brandeis Brief ’-type information,” is the model that is
best supported by data regarding the impact of such briefs at the Court. Id. at
748, 778, 816.
199. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2000).
200. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 137, at 82 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 330–32). McGinnis and Mulaney also point out a similar reliance on amicus
briefs in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), specifically in the
Court’s conclusion that the state’s justification for excluding women from the
Virginia Military Institute was not sufficient. McGinnis & Mulaney, supra
note 137, at 82 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 585–86 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
201. EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 741 (9th ed.
2007).
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a particularly wide range of new evidence on appeal, and the
independence of the amici may well persuade a court to rely on
that new evidence to a particularly substantial degree.202
7. New Evidence and Petitions for Discretionary Review
The next mechanism for introducing new evidence on appeal is found almost exclusively in courts of last resort. In particular, those courts often ask parties seeking discretionary review to demonstrate that the issues presented in their petition
are important in a broader legal or social context.203 This example is particularly unique, in that it is one of the few areas
in which appellate courts almost explicitly require parties to
present the courts with information that is outside the scope of
the trial record.204
Consider, for instance, Rule 10 of the U.S. Supreme Court,
which calls for a party filing a petition for certiorari to demonstrate in the petition that the petition presents questions regarding an “important matter” (Rule 10(a)), an “important federal question” (Rule 10(a) and (b)), or an “important question of
federal law” (Rule 10(c)).205
Parties seeking discretionary review in the state courts are
generally called upon to make the same showing. In California,
for instance, the Supreme Court may grant review in order to
202. See SIMPSON & VASALY, supra note 196, at 10 (noting that from 1985–
1995, “more than 35 percent of Supreme Court opinions in which amicus briefs
were filed contained reference to at least one amicus brief.”); id. at 10–16 (collecting case references to amicus briefs).
203. See, e.g., MINN. R. APP. P. 117(2)(a), (d)(2) (including “importance” and
“possible statewide impact” among criteria considered in evaluation of a petition for discretionary review); N.Y. CT. APP. R. PRAC. 500.22( b)(4) (requiring
motions for permission to appeal to include statement regarding why issue is
of “public importance”); OR. R. APP. P. 9.07(3) (noting that number of people
affected, and consequence of the decision to the public, is a criterion considered in evaluating a petition for review); cf. Diamond Ventures, LLC v.
Barreto, 452 F.3d 892, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding, on petition to allow discretionary interlocutory appeal, the “importance” requirement satisfied where
“the privacy and competitive interests of the SBIC applicants . . . overcome the
interest in finality”).
204. See See, supra note 9, at 176.
205. SUP. CT. R. 10; see also GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 201, at 262–63
(noting “major significance” of “importance” to whether petition is granted,
and how the “nature and number of persons affected” influences that determination); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 253 (1991) (noting that “certworthiness” of
petition to U.S. Supreme Court depended, in part, on whether petition presented issues “important to the polity . . . of huge political and social importance . . . emanat[ing] from their impact on society”).
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“settle an important question of law.”206 Oregon’s Supreme
Court is even more explicit in its invitation to parties to offer
evidence beyond the scope of what parties might have offered in
the trial court: not only are parties required to demonstrate
why their petition presents a question that has “importance beyond the particular case,”207 but parties are explicitly told that
importance may turn, for instance, on “[w]hether the issue or a
similar issue arises often,” “[w]hether many people are affected
by the decision in the case,” and “[w]hether the consequence of
the decision is important to the public, even if the issue may
not arise often.”208
In order to adequately meet this sort of request, parties
must generally look well beyond the scope of the trial court record. Demonstrating importance requires parties to place the
questions for review into a broader legal, political, social, or
economic context.209 While some of the facts showing that context may well be part of the trial record, it would be rare for the
record to have focused on importance to any substantial degree.
This is true for at least three reasons. First, trial attorneys
have little reason to think that importance (as a factual matter)
will ever have a bearing on their case, not least because they
would hope to win at trial and avoid a need to appeal at all. Second, even if the parties presciently believed that their case
might one day require a petition for discretionary review, most
trial judges would (properly!) reject as irrelevant a party’s ef206. CAL. APP. R. 8.500( b)(1); see also id. at R. 8.504( b)(2) (requiring petition for review to state reasons for review under 8.500( b)).
207. OR. R. APP. P. 9.05(4)(c).
208. Id. 9.07(2)–(3).
209. Cf. Diamond Ventures, LLC v. Barreto, 452 F.3d 892, 896–98 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (referring to the privacy and competitive interests of applicants as
the basis for a finding of sufficient importance to merit interlocutory review).
Amicus briefs (and their accompanying introduction of new evidence on appeal) can serve an important role in signaling the importance of a case to a
court. Several commentators encourage parties seeking certiorari in the U.S.
Supreme Court to solicit amicus support at the certiorari stage in order to improve the chance of a petition being granted. See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note
201, at 263; PERRY, supra note 205, at 135.
Admittedly, an important question of law might be important in an
academic or legal sense (it might affect the way a large number of cases are
processed, for instance) without necessarily being important as a political,
economic, or social matter. A party might, therefore, be able to demonstrate
importance without a clear need to resort to new information at the petition
stage. In many other cases, however, a party will necessarily have to refer to
new evidence on appeal if they hope to demonstrate the importance of their
petition.
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fort to offer evidence in order to demonstrate the future importance of certain issues—particularly issues that the trial
judge (presumably) thought were decided correctly in the first
instance. Finally, because issues meriting discretionary review
are often not sufficiently defined until after a decision by the
intermediate appellate court, even prescient parties and willing
trial judges would generally often guess incorrectly if they attempted to develop evidence about the importance of a case
several procedural steps before review by a court of last resort.
For all these reasons, then, the record will generally include very little information regarding the importance of the
issue in a wider social context. In order to meet their obligations under the relevant court rules, the parties are therefore
required to offer the court new evidence supporting the petition’s claims of importance.210 This is significant not merely because it affects the decision on whether to review a case, but
because such information may carry over into a subsequent
discussion on the merits.211 This is particularly true when an
appellate court is presented with a facial challenge to the validity of a given statute. Such facial challenges necessarily present
questions regarding legislative meaning and the likely effect of
a particular law or judicial decision—questions that implicate
facts reaching well beyond the parties and events connected to
a specific application of the law.212
210. Although not as clear an example, a similar consideration is found in
the collateral order doctrine, which treats certain interlocutory decisions as
“final” for purposes of an appeal as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See generally Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546–47 (1949) (announcing the doctrine); 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911 (2d ed. 1992). Although an appeal
from a collateral order is not discretionary, in the sense that the Court of Appeals cannot decline jurisdiction in a case where the relevant conditions are
met, the court of appeals nevertheless remains responsible for determining
whether those factors are met in the first instance. In making that assessment, at least some courts have concluded that a party must show the “importance” of their case, demonstrating that it is something more than a run-ofthe-mill erroneous decision by the court below. But see 15A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911.5
(Supp. 2011) (noting that the “importance” showing under the collateral order
doctrine has something of a “checkered career”).
211. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 2, at 4 –5 (recounting Supreme Court oral
argument in which Chief Justice John Roberts referenced his independent internet research when posing questions to counsel).
212. For a discussion of statutory facial challenges involving scientific evidence, see Stephanie Tai, Uncertainty About Uncertainty: The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Assessing Scientific Uncertainty, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671,
672–73 (2009). “[R]esolutions can be especially complicated where statutory
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8. Independent Research as a Source of New Evidence
Perhaps the most common mechanism for the discovery of
new information on appeal is independent research into issues
in the case conducted by judges and their staff. As one commentator noted (paraphrasing the findings in Marvell’s study),
the “judiciary’s current method of absorbing scientific information on legislative facts is haphazard, unruly and unreliable.
One study of appellate litigation reported that forty percent of
the cited references to the scientific literature came via the
court’s independent research, unaided by the lawyers or the
record made in the lower court.”213
With the advent of the internet and the breadth of information available online, judges are not only much more able to
access legal information, but it is much easier to access information that has relevance to a given case—whether that information is deemed adjudicative, legislative, or otherwise.214 Given the pervasiveness of the internet, it would be surprising if
challenges arise facially because the science before the courts can involve legislative facts beyond those concerning the immediate parties in the case.” Id.
213. Maurice Rosenberg, Improving the Courts’ Ability to Absorb Scientific
Information, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND JUDICIARY 480, 482 (William T. Golden ed., 1988) (citing
MARVELL, supra note 16, at 192).
214. See generally Richard B. Cappalli, Bringing Internet Information to
Court: Of “Legislative Facts,” 75 TEMP. L. REV. 99 (2002). While the primary
issue for this Article is independent research by judges, the problem is, perhaps, even more significant when it comes to inexperienced jurors who are
used to seeking out information on the internet. Much has been written on the
risks presented by independent research by jurors into case information, and
the scope of appropriate efforts to prevent it. See Daniel W. Bell, Juror Misconduct and the Internet, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81, 83 (2010) (asserting that incidents of unauthorized juror research “have dramatically increased since the
advent of the Internet”); George L. Blum, Prejudicial Effect of Juror Misconduct Arising from Internet Usage, 48 A.L.R. 6TH 135, 141–44 (2009) (collecting
cases); Laura W. Lee, Silencing the “Twittering Juror”: The Need to Modernize
Pattern Cautionary Jury Instructions to Reflect the Realities of the Electronic
Age, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 181, 186 (2010) (discussing jurors’ problematic use of
Twitter); Susan Macpherson & Beth Bonora, The Wired Juror, Unplugged,
TRIAL, Nov. 2010, at 40 (noting the “new challenges” to the modern jury system as communication habits change in an increasingly electronic environment); Caren M. Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1581 (2011) (noting a growing trend of jurors “conducting unauthorized online research”). It is
worth considering why the legal system’s rules regarding independent research by jurors is so much stricter than for judges. The answers likely lie in
(a) an implicit assessment of judicial, as opposed to juror, competence in evaluating the quality of legislative facts, and ( b) concern that judges may be
marginally less likely to seek out participation by the parties in the event that
a factual dispute regarding the relevant information becomes apparent.
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law clerks in appellate courts did not occasionally inform themselves about the basic information in a case by referring to
Google Maps or Wikipedia.
Of course, a court is unlikely to stray into independent research of adjudicative facts. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges “shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall consider only the evidence
presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed.”215 For this reason, judges are well aware of constraints
on independent research into adjudicative facts. When it comes
to legislative facts, however, neither the code, the rules of evidence, nor any other positive law places significant limits on the
ability of the court to investigate and rely upon such evidence.216
Courts take advantage of this flexibility. In Singh v. Ashcroft, for instance, the Ninth Circuit reversed a Board of Immigration Appeals decision rejecting an application for asylum.217
The applicant alleged that he feared retaliation by a former
employer, a CIA-like entity within the Indian national government called the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).218 The
BIA concluded that there was insufficient evidence presented of
the RAW’s existence, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating
that “[t]he RAW does exist”:219
The existence and operations of the RAW are readily known by the
employment of an accessory tool as familiar in legal research today as
Shephard’s Citations were half a century ago. A simple Lexis search
reveals over 1,500 articles on the RAW from reputable international
media sources including the BBC. . . . If this case had involved an
agent’s claimed membership in an agency more well-known in the
United States . . . . [this] issue simply would not have arisen because
the IJ or BIA would have unconsciously taken notice of the fact of
those agencies’ existence. Judicial notice is appropriate in exactly this
circumstance—to ensure that administrative or judicial ignorance is
215. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(C) (2007). Neither the
comments nor the rule define “facts in a matter.” See id. & cmts. 1–7.
216. See Thornburg, supra note 5, at 136 (“But they may independently ascertain and use information that meets the requirements for judicial notice,
and they may investigate ‘legislative facts’—those that inform the court’s
judgment when deciding questions of law or policy—to their hearts’ content,
bound by no rules about sources, reliability, or notice to the parties.”); cf.
George R. Currie, Appellate Courts Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, 1960 WIS. L. REV. 39, 39
(“Whether an appellate court will take judicial notice of a fact on appeal which
was not noted by the trial court, or called to that court’s attention, rests largely in the discretion of the appellate court.”).
217. Singh v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2004).
218. Id. at 904.
219. Id. at 905.
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not insulated from review through hyper-technical application of the
general rule that the court can consider only evidence considered by
the Board.220

This is not a new issue for the courts. Even before the internet was so pervasive, there was “no reason to suspect that
justices, just like other Americans, do not obtain information
about current events from television, the radio, and newspapers.”221 Professor Davis reports that after his lecture published in Minnesota Law Review, he spoke with the Congressional Research Service and learned that “[a] Supreme Court
law clerk sought CRS assistance in Bowen v. American Hospital Association . . . and the Court cited a CRS study in footnote
30, using the names of authors but not mentioning the CRS.
The record shows no predecision chance for the losing party to
respond to the study.”222 And it should be no surprise that, after becoming a Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis “continued his extensive factual studies and wrote many opinions saturated with facts brought to light through his own
researches.”223 Independent research has long been a source of
new evidence on appeal; the internet just makes it that much
more common.
While independent research is perhaps the most typical
way for new evidence to make its way before the appellate
courts, it is also the mechanism that causes the most concern.224 When new evidence is considered as a result of the
stipulation of parties (and a flexible appellate court),225 or when
it is introduced via Brandeis briefs, amicus briefs, or petitions
for review, the nature of the new evidence is clear. If the parties disagree with a particular conclusion, they can challenge
220. Id. at 906–07 (emphasis added); see also Baptist Health v.
BancorpSouth Ins. Servs., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 268, 276 n.5 (N.D. Miss. 2010) (relying on “simple Google and Yahoo! searches . . . [as well as] searches . . . performed on both Westlaw.com and Lexis.com” to reveal that information claimed as privileged was already in the public domain); Muehlbauer
v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 05 C 2676, 2009 WL 874511, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31,
2009) (finding facts, based on a “simple Google search,” contradicting plaintiff ’s argument that public safety required release of defendants’ “confidential”
documents because the information was already available online).
221. Epstein & Knight, supra note 198, at 220.
222. Davis, supra note 9, at 18.
223. Davis, supra note 19, at 403 (citing Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan,
264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
224. See Thornburg, supra note 5, at 132–33 (observing that the rise of the
Internet has “turned a once-marginal concern into a dilemma that affects
courts and litigants daily”).
225. See supra Part II.B.1.
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its substance, move to strike the evidence, or seek remand for
further development of the facts. When the court conducts and
relies on its own research, however, the new evidence is often
hidden (unless, as in Belleville, it solicits additional information
from the parties).226 If it is revealed in the final opinion, it becomes known only at the last possible moment in the appellate
process, forcing parties to either accept the court’s findings or
request relief via rarely granted motions for reconsideration.227
Absent great care by the appellate court, reliance on independent research risks error while undermining the confidence of
the public and parties in the work of both appellate and trial
courts.228
CONCLUSION
A. TOWARD AN OPEN AND RATIONAL CONSIDERATION OF NEW
EVIDENCE ON APPEAL
Perhaps the most telling characteristic of the use of new
evidence on appeal is the great unwillingness of courts to confront the conflict between their use of new evidence and the
well-accepted principle of record review.229 The record review
rule helps to define the very nature of appellate courts and the
appellate process, and while the courts are apparently willing
to live with exceptions to the general rule, the exceptions often
fall prey to internal inconsistencies and suffer from a lack of
coherence.230 The most common message that flows from the
case law, then, is that appellate courts do not consider new evi-

226. Cf. Peggy C. Davis, “There Is a Book Out . . .” : An Analysis of Judicial
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1541 (1987) (observing that current practice affords judges “a dangerous freedom”).
227. See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 201, at 814 –15 (“[T]he plain fact is
that the Supreme Court seldom grants a rehearing of any kind . . . .”); STERN,
supra note 17, at 441 (noting that “[t]he vast majority” of petitions for rehearing “have no chance of success”); UHLRICH, KESSLER & ANGER, P.C. & SIDLEY
& AUSTIN, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE: NINTH CIRCUIT § 9.11 at 624 –25
(2nd ed. 1999) (noting, inter alia, that in 1997, only 16 of 610 petitions for rehearing in the Ninth Circuit were granted).
228. See Gorod, supra note 2, at 68 (noting that the U.S. legal system’s
“adversarial myth” demands that “suitable procedures are in place to deal
with all of the cases in the nation’s court system, those that turn on adjudicative and legislative facts alike,” but that current practice is not always
sufficient).
229. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Part II.

2012]

NEW EVIDENCE ON APPEAL

2061

dence on appeal.231 As should be clear to the reader by now,
that message is, in fact, incorrect. Until the courts are willing
to concede the point, they are unlikely to be willing to conduct a
comprehensive look at the role that new evidence plays on appeal. It is only through such a review that the courts can provide a reasoned explanation for what otherwise seems an irresolvable conflict between, on one hand, the principle of no new
evidence on appeal, and the willingness, on the other, to consider such evidence whenever it aids the court in its consideration of the case. Such an inconsistent approach undermines
confidence in the courts and exposes the appellate courts to
criticism for acting incoherently.
This Article’s review of the traditional record review principle and the many exceptions to it provides a starting point for
the comprehensive review that has so far been lacking. There
are several main points to draw from this review:
First, appellate courts do consider new evidence on appeal,
and they do it regularly.232 This is particularly true in the context of legislative facts, though it is also not at all rare even for
adjudicative facts.
Second, the traditional rule limiting appellate review to information provided to the trial court is just that—a tradition.233
While efficiency and fairness provide good justifications for adhering to the principle in most situations, no fundamental constitutional or statutory principles are undermined by variations
from the traditional rule against the use of new evidence on
appeal.234
231. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part II.
233. See supra Part I.B.
234. Joan Steinman’s recent article discusses the degree to which the federal constitution may constrain federal appellate courts’ authority to consider
new issues on appeal under the federal constitution. Steinman, supra note 22
(manuscript at 20–24, 84 –85). She notes that constitutional “appellate” jurisdiction is imbued with common law principles. Id. at 27. Even if the federal
constitution imposed limits on the U.S. Supreme Court, however, there is no
textual constraint on the state courts, and arguably less constraint on the intermediate federal appellate courts. Because the principle of record review
rule is largely a constant across both federal and state courts, the source of the
rule must substantially be systemic and historical, rather than text-based.
In certain circumstances, due process considerations may place limits on
the ability of courts to consider new evidence in the absence of another party’s
ability to respond. This consideration is more likely to matter in the context of
adjudicative facts; for legislative facts, parties are often lucky if they are even
made aware of the use of legislative facts prior to the final decision, let alone
given an opportunity to respond. Cf. Gorod, supra note 2, at 4 –5 (noting lim-
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Third, because there is flexibility in the traditional record
review principle, exceptions to that rule are not ethically questionable or legally suspect.235 Rather like the rule itself, the exceptions have arisen in order to address particular situations in
which fundamental goals of appellate process are best met by
allowing the appellate courts to consider new evidence on appeal, rather than insisting on vigorous enforcement of the general rule.
Fourth, because each exception arises out of a different
procedural situation, the rationale justifying each exception
should be different, although it should be clearly articulated in
each case. In particular, the authority of the appellate court to
consider new evidence should be most sweeping when the new
evidence is being used to determine issues within the particular
authority of the appellate court.236
The most obvious place for appellate courts to clarify that
new evidence may be necessary is in their consideration of discretionary petitions for review. Because courts of last resort
have exclusive authority to determine whether to grant petitions for certiorari (or petitions for review),237 their power to
consider new evidence that bears on whether to grant those petitions should be quite broad. In this area, the use of new evidence on appeal is both appropriate and consistent with the
overall purposes of appellate review, and parties and the courts
would benefit from explicitly noting, whether in rules or otherwise, that the appellate court anticipates the need to consider
new evidence on appeal in evaluating these petitions. These
statements should also establish processes to manage disputes
regarding the validity of new evidence when it is introduced
(whether by courts or parties) at a stage in the process that
does not otherwise permit a response.
The appellate courts have significant, but not exclusive,
authority over determinations of subject matter jurisdiction
and the informative role of amicus briefs, followed closely by
ited opportunity by party to respond at oral argument to new information presented by Chief Justice Roberts).
235. See supra Part II.
236. Cf. Steinman, supra note 22 (manuscript at 44) (observing that “the
occasions on which appellate courts have been inclined to resolve issues that
the district court did not decide correspond to the appellate courts’ competency
and role, the efficiencies apparently to be gained, and the justifications for departing from the norm against deciding new issues”).
237. SUP. CT. R. 16 (explaining process of disposition of a petition for a writ
of certiorari).
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consideration of legislative facts in the exercise of their lawmaking authority.238 Appellate courts should be willing to invite the submission of new evidence in these areas, although
they should tolerate less in the way of disputes between the
parties before deciding to remand matters to the trial court or
to altogether exclude the use of new evidence on appeal.
Least flexible of all the exceptions should be those that
permit appellate courts to consider disputed—or even unsettled—questions of adjudicative fact. Those issues are best left
to the trial courts and their expertise in fact-finding, although
in rare cases the benefits of immediate appellate review may
outweigh the value of leaving fact-finding to the trial courts.
This spectrum of appellate consideration of new evidence
on appeal matches, to some degree, existing law. Any explicit
acknowledgement of the use of new evidence on appeal, however, would benefit from an explicit association between appellate
court authority and the exceptions to the traditional rule.
Fifth, the apparently inconsistent use of exceptions to the
record review rule does not need to be inconsistent. A decision
regarding whether to apply an exception should be explained
not in terms of whether to apply the traditional rule or not, but
rather as a determination about whether the fundamental
goals of appellate review are better met by applying the exception or the default rule. If fundamental concerns about fairness
are met—i.e., if parties have an opportunity to respond, if there
is no showing of strategic behavior associated with the belated
introduction of the new evidence, and if there is enough agreement on the substance of the new evidence (or a possibility of
resolving it within the procedural constraints of the appellate
process)—then the exception should be granted. Appellate
courts must always be willing to recalibrate their use of exceptions so that they do not undermine the principles of efficiency
and fairness that underlie the record review default rule. Nevertheless, by acknowledging both the default rule and the exception in the same discussion, courts will move toward a more
candid and, with discussion, an ultimately more coherent application of both the record review default rule and the many
exceptions to that rule.
Finally, the primary utility of this kind of comprehensive
evaluation of new evidence on appeal comes from what Peggy
Davis called the “simple acknowledgement” of the complex
238. See supra Part II.B.
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work conducted by appellate courts.239 Although Davis’s effort
was focused on having appellate courts acknowledge their role
in the process of lawmaking, her broader point still applies: appellate court recognition of the fundamental principles under
which they function—even when those principles may vary
from traditional understandings about how appellate courts
should work—effectively forces courts to consider how to engage in discussions that help define and regularize the use of
those principles.
By recognizing and accepting their long-standing use of
new evidence on appeal, appellate courts will take a significant
step toward a comprehensive understanding of how these exceptions to the traditional rule fit within the broader work of
the appellate courts.
B. NEW EVIDENCE ON APPEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF
LEGISLATIVE FACTS
One additional benefit may flow from a generalized effort
to have appellate courts think about the problem of new evidence on appeal: it will distract attention from the particularly
vexing problem posed by legislative facts, and may, as a result,
help to accomplish the very goals that Peggy Davis and other
commentators articulated in this area some twenty-five years
ago.
When she wrote in 1987, Professor Davis noted that “[w]ith
a few notable exceptions, courts and legislatures have failed or
refused to regulate the process that has come to be known as
judicial notice of legislative facts.”240 Her article, as well as the
contemporary pieces by Kenneth Davis, Robert Keeton, Ann
Woolhandler, and others,241 called for a level of attention to the
239. Davis, supra note 226, at 1600–01 (discussing acknowledgment of the
lawmaking function of the appellate courts). Davis argues that legislative
factfinding should take place only with certain safeguards: (1) inviting all interested parties to participate in the identification and evaluation of relevant
legislative facts, (2) acknowledging the legislative function of judges, and (3)
being attentive to the line between adjudicative and legislative factfinding. Id.
at 1598–1602; see also Gorod, supra note 2, at 71 (discussing the value of explicit acknowledgement of judicial use of legislative facts).
240. Davis, supra note 226, at 1540; see also id. at 1542 (the “legal enshrinement” of legislative facts “is casual and unselfconscious”).
241. See Davis, supra note 9, at 17 ( proposing that Congress develop a research service for the Supreme Court in response to perceived inadequacies of
current practice); Keeton, supra note 9, at 44 –49 (offering suggestions for improving use of legislative facts by courts); John Monahan & Laurens Walker,
Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in

2012]

NEW EVIDENCE ON APPEAL

2065

use of legislative facts, but very little change resulted from
their call. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 reads as it always has,
and courts continue to consider new evidence regarding legislative facts on a regular basis.242
The work of those scholars may have been lost, in part, because an honest discussion about legislative facts, and particularly about those facts in the appellate process, requires appellate courts to acknowledge two indisputable points that they
have difficulty acknowledging: that courts make law, and that
appellate courts regularly consider information beyond the
scope of the trial court record.243
By encouraging discussion on the latter point, and focusing
attention on the appellate process, rather than the more controversial and difficult problem of legislative fact and judicial
lawmaking, this Article may help “bring along” a coherent approach to appellate court consideration of legislative facts. Because most legislative facts are evaluated by appellate courts
considering new evidence on appeal, attention to the broad procedural problem may provide the necessary entrée to discussing
the lingering issue of legislative facts.
The self-reflection called for by this Article—paying attention to when the courts are engaged in consideration of new evidence on appeal—is an easier task than the one demanded by
Peggy Davis: paying attention to when the court is engaged in
lawmaking, rather than law interpreting. This provides a further benefit: To the degree that courts need a warning when
they are straying into the more creative uses of their lawmaking power, their use of new evidence on appeal provides something of a canary in the mine. When courts see themselves considering a wide range of evidence that was not available to the
trial court, they should recognize that they are veering farther
away from the straightforward interpretive functions of appel-

Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 498 (1986) (observing that the issue of courts’ use
of “empirical information after it has been obtained—by whatever means—has
received remarkably little attention”); Woolhandler, supra note 9, at 126 (identifying the possible pitfalls of a rationalized approach to decision-making in
the judicial process). Their ranks have been recently joined by Brianne J.
Gorod. Gorod, supra note 2, at 8 (“Although it is perhaps unsurprising that
courts sometimes rely on extra-record facts, it is surprising that the phenomenon has received so little attention . . . .” (citation omitted)).
242. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
243. Gorod, supra note 2, at 50–51 (noting “existential” difficulty of appellate courts acknowledging the use of legislative facts).

2066

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:2016

late courts.244 The point is not to warn appellate courts away,
but simply to alert them to be particularly cautious about the
use of the new evidence in order to ensure that (a) parties are
able to adequately participate in the evaluation of those legislative facts, and (b) courts increase their level of caution to ensure that any independent research into legislative facts is
done with great care. Taking such care would go far toward addressing the more significant concerns that commentators have
noted regarding the use of legislative facts.
In these ways, the issues of new evidence on appeal may
help to serve as something of a proxy for the difficult problem of
how to manage the use of legislative facts. By paying more attention to how they resolve procedural problems, courts may
end up doing a better job in managing their substantive work
as well.

244. As one example of this kind of “legislative fact as judicial warning”
system, consider a recent draft article in which Lumen Mulligan and Glen
Staszewski suggest that a need to resolve legislative facts should be a clue
that certain disputes regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be
decided not by the Supreme Court, but by the notice and comment process of
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee. See Lumen Mulligan & Glen Staszewski,
The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: The Lessons of Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming June 2012), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1897864.

